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Summary
In numerous real world applications, one needs to store almost the whole
data set in order to compute certain functions of the data, where we require
the answer to be exact or even approximate in some cases. This thesis will
examine a model for data streaming algorithms where we engage the ser-
vices of external third parties to do difficult computations for the client.
The main motivating application of this is cloud computing, where we not
only require the cloud to store the massive data set, but execute compu-
tations on the data set and communicate the results to the client as well.
The client should be able to verify the correctness of the result within his
computational restrictions. We will discuss algorithms to achieve this in
different streaming models, depending on the interaction between the client
and the external third party who is also called the prover.
The communication complexity model augmented with a prover is a
very important tool used to analyze the theoretical properties of the data
streaming model with a prover. We use this to give an improved lower
bound for approximating the frequency moments in the annotation stream-
ing model, where there is a single help message from the prover after the
stream has ended. We also investigate a restricted version of this model
and show lower bounds in this restricted model. We will use our lower
bounds to study the theoretical properties of the streaming model with a
prover, where the prover and the client are allowed to interact.
We give an improvement of previous work in [30] which requires O˜(
√
n)
communication between the prover and the client to compute the number
vi
of distinct elements exactly using O(logm) messages, where n is the length
of the stream and m is the size of the universe. Our algorithm gives an
exponential improvement on the total communication needed while main-
taining the same number of messages exchanged.
We also investigate a new streaming model that only bounds the com-
munication overhead, i.e., the amount of communication sent from the
prover to the client per symbol of the data stream. This streaming model
is different from previous models defined in [20,21,28–30,56,102]. We will
design algorithms for four different streaming problems in this new model.
For one of these streaming problems (perfect matching problem), there is
no known efficient interactive streaming algorithm in the previous mod-
els [29,30,52]. We will analyse the limitations of this new model. We show
that the verification phase with a large number of communication rounds
between the prover and the client after the stream has ended is unavoidable
for certain problems in a restricted streaming model where the messages
from the client to the prover are just some of his random bits.
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communication complexity classes.
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Data streaming algorithms are designed to process massive data sets
arriving one at a time in an online fashion, i.e. with small time overhead.
The space used by these algorithms should be minimal. Due to the enor-
mous amount of data being generated in this century, designing efficient
streaming algorithms and models to handle these huge data sets are impor-
tant areas to explore. Some of the interesting problems studied in the data
stream model include frequency moments which we will define formally in
Chapter 2 and graph problems like matching and triangle counting [14,38].
We denote the length of the stream by n where each symbol is drawn
from a universe of size m. Many interesting problems in the data stream
model (e.g. third or higher frequency moments [6, 18]) require large space
to even give a constant factor approximation. Due to such limitations in
the standard streaming model, more powerful models have been studied
which introduces a third party who processes the stream and provides the
answer together with a proof of correctness after the stream has ended [20–
22, 28–30, 56, 74, 101, 102]. We view the third party as the helper who
convinces the client of the correct answer. The client has the usual small
space requirement but the helper can store the whole data stream. To
make the model realistic, the helper is online in the sense that he cannot
predict the future parts of the stream. The help provided should be short
and inexpensive to check as well. How can the client be convinced that
the results produced by the third party are correct? Ideas from the theory
of interactive proofs are used to reject a claim by a dishonest helper with
high probability. Throughout this thesis, we will refer to the helper as the
prover, and to the client as the verifier.
There are many reasons for using the services of third parties to execute
computations for the verifier. One obvious reason would be that the verifier
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does not have the resources (mainly due to space constraints) to execute
the computations by himself. If one generates massive data only once
in a while, it is more practical to rent some hundreds of computers for
a few hours and get the third party to do the necessary computations.
The cost of buying hundred such computers is too costly and a waste of
resources if they are not used frequently. They are many internet companies
with enormous data warehouses and powerful computers that offer cloud
computing services.
The main aim of this thesis is to study the power and limitations of
algorithms in different models for delegating computations on data streams
to third parties.
1.1 Structure of this Thesis and Contribu-
tions Made
• In Chapter 2, we introduce both the data streaming and one-way
communication complexity models. We show how results from com-
munication complexity can be used to prove space lower bounds for
streaming algorithms. The purpose of this chapter is to show that
many interesting problems in the data streaming model cannot be
solved in sublinear space, which will motivate the models that we
will introduce in the subsequent chapters.
• In Chapter 3, we introduce the annotation model for verifying com-
putations on data streams, which was first introduced in [21]. In this
model, the prover provides an annotation/proof to the verifier after
the data stream has ended. The proof is processed by the verifier in
a streaming fashion and the verifier is allowed to use randomness to
3
process the proof stream. As a warmup, we give simple annotation
protocols based on fingerprinting techniques before giving annotation
protocols for the exact computations of the frequency moments F2,
F0 and F∞. The main purpose for doing so is to illustrate that we
can obtain sublinear annotation protocols for problems which require
linear space in the standard streaming model, which is the model
without the prover.
We introduce the Merlin-Arthur communication complexity model
to address lower bounds for data stream computations with a prover.
By analyzing the number-in-hand (NIH) multi-party online Merlin-
Arthur communication model, we improve the lower bound given
in [21] for approximating Fk in the annotation model. We show
lower bounds for the online Merlin-Arthur communication complex-
ity model with k-messages. Our lower bounds follow from well-known
round elimination results in the theory of interactive proofs [9, 10].
Our lower bounds for the online Merlin-Arthur communication model
with k messages combined with a result from [22] give an exponential
separation between the public and private coin streaming models.
• In Chapter 4, we introduce the interactive streaming model which was
first defined in [30]. We show that any language f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1} which is in PSPACEcc (See Definition 4.2.2) has an online
Merlin-Arthur protocol with polylog(n) messages and the cost of this
protocol is polylog(n). Combining this with Lautemann’s theorem




We also briefly discuss the O(logm) round protocol for the exact com-
putation of F2, F0 and F∞ which was first given in [30]. These pro-
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tocols are more practical than the generic streaming protocol which
is based on circuit checking [52].
• In Chapter 5, we give a streaming interactive protocol with logm
rounds for the exact computation of F0 using v bits of space and










log n+ log3m · (log logm)2 )) .
The update time of the verifier per symbol received is O(log2m).
This solves one of the open problems posed by Cormode, Thaler and
Yi [30]. Table 1.1.1 gives a summary of the known results for the
exact computation of F0 in the prover-verifier model.
Paper Space Total Communication Rounds
[21] m2/3 logm m2/3 logm 1




Our work log2m(log logm)2 log4m (log logm)2 logm
Table 1.1.1: Comparison of our protocol to previous protocols for comput-
ing the exact number of distinct elements in a data stream. The results
are stated for the case where m = Θ(n). The complexities of the space and
the total communication are correct up to a constant.
• In Chapter 6, we propose a new model which relaxes the restriction
placed on the total communication in prior models [29, 30]. Unlike
previous works which bound the total communication between the
prover and verifier, in our model we only bound the communica-
tion overhead, which is the amount of machine words exchanged per
symbol seen on the data stream. Our new model disallows a lot of
communication or rounds of interaction after the stream has ended.
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In particular, this makes the prover more efficient and his work is
spread out more compared to previous protocols in [29,30]. The pro-
tocols we design are simpler and more efficient as they are not based
on interactive proof techniques which have an additional verification
phase after the stream ends. In previous works [29, 30], the main
conversations take place after the stream has ended and during this
verification phase, the prover has to perform exponentially more op-
erations than the verifier. This additional verification phase is not
present in our protocols.
We give streaming protocols in our new model for the following four
problems: Median, Longest Increasing Subsequence, FULL RANK
and perfect matching. The perfect matching problem is not known to
be in the complexity class NC, and thus the generic streaming proto-
col in [29,30,52] does not apply. By relaxing the total communication
restriction, we managed to find an algorithm for the perfect matching
problem while maintaining the full online nature of streaming. The
natural question to ask is whether all functions in NC can avoid the
additional verification phase after the stream has ended. The an-
swer to this is negative in the public coin model. We show that any
function with a “strict” reduction from Index on n bits cannot be
solved in the public coin model, requiring at least Ω(log n/ log log n)
rounds of interaction between the prover and verifier after the stream
ends in the public coin model, otherwise either the communication
complexity after the stream ends increases to above polylog(n) or the
space complexity of the verifier increases to above polylog(n). This
simply means that the extra verification phase is an inherent feature
in the Merlin-Arthur streaming model for protocols solving problems
6
which have a strict reduction from Index, e.g., computing frequency
moments. Our lower bounds shed light on both our new model and
prior models.






In this chapter, we introduce the models for data streaming and com-
munication complexity. Different communication complexity models have
been used to establish lower bounds for data stream problems in different
models. In this chapter, we will introduce the standard model as defined
in the seminal work of Alon, Matias and Szegedy [6] and look at the limi-
tations of this model.
2.1 The Data Stream Models
The input stream is denoted by σ = 〈a1, · · · , an〉, where the ai’s are
sometimes referred to as symbols in this thesis. The data stream defines
a function A : [N ] → R. The data elements in the stream arrive in an
online fashion, and the system has no control over the order in which the
data streams arrive. The main objective of data streaming algorithms is
to process a massive data set arriving one item at a time in an online
fashion, i.e., with small time overhead, while at the same time minimizing
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the workspace used by the algorithm. In this thesis, we use the unit cost
RAM model to measure the update time per symbol seen on the stream.
In this model, each field operation1 takes unit time. These algorithms are
only allowed to have one pass over the data stream and are allowed to
be randomized. These algorithms have to output the right answer with
some constant probability larger than 1
2
. There are three different types
of models which describe the inputs ai of the stream. We list these three
models below and give a motivating example for each of them.
1. Time Series Model. Here n = N and each ai = A(i) in increasing
order of i. For instance, each ai could be used to model the price of
some stock. The data stream gives the price of the stock at different
time intervals. After some fixed period of time, we are given a time
period t1, t2 ∈ [n] and we need to output
∑t2
i=t1
ai. If t1 = t2 and
each ai ∈ {0, 1}, this is the famous Index problem which is defined
in Definition 2.2.2.
2. Cash Register Model: Each ai = (j, Ii) where Ii ≥ 1. We update
A(j) ← A(j) + Ii. Here, multiple ai’s can update the same A(j).
This is the most popular data stream model studied. One example
would be to count or estimate the number of distinct queries made to
a search engine. Each ai will be the query made to the search engine.
The goal is to output the number of distinct elements in the vector
A.
3. Turnstile Model: This is similar to the cash register model but we
allow Ii to be positive or negative. If we want A(i) ≥ 0 for all i at
all times, we call this the strict turnstile model. This can be used to
1Examples of field operations over Fp where p = poly(m,n) include addition, sub-
traction, multiplication, division or choosing a random field element.
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model insertions and deletions in a database.
In this thesis, we will work in the cash register model where each ai = (j, 1).
So from now on, our stream is σ = 〈a1, · · · , an〉 where each ai ∈ [m] unless
otherwise stated. We say that the stream σ has length n where each symbol
is drawn from a universe of size m. Ideally, the space used by the algorithm
should be sublinear in m and n, and the update time per item ai on the
stream should be polylog(m,n). We will measure the space used by the
streaming algorithm in bits.
Definition 2.1.1. ( Streaming Algorithm )
Let f : [m]n → R be a function and suppose that the input stream is
σ = 〈a1, · · · , an〉 where each ai ∈ [m]. A streaming algorithm for f is a
randomized algorithm which is given a one-pass access to the input stream
σ. The algorithm is also given an error parameter  and a confidence
parameter 0 ≤ δ < 1. For any input stream σ, the algorithm is required
to output a value in the interval ((1− )f(σ), (1 + )f(σ)) with probability
at least 1− δ. If  = 0, we say that the streaming algorithm computes the
exact value of the function f .
The two main measures of complexity for streaming algorithms are the
space (in bits) and the update time per data symbol. Given  and δ, the
space is the maximum amount of workspace the algorithm uses over all
possible input streams and all the random choices of the algorithm. The
update time per data symbol for a given  and δ is the maximum time2 the
algorithm spends on a single symbol ai of the stream, where the maximum
is taken over all i ∈ [n], all possible input streams and all the random
choices of the algorithm.
2The time is measured in the unit cost RAM model, which was mentioned previously
in this section.
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The interested reader is referred to the survey by Muthukrishnan [86].
This survey contains many interesting applications of streaming algorithms
and very well motivates this interesting subject.
2.2 Communication Complexity
We introduce some basic definitions and results in communication com-
plexity that will be useful for this chapter. As we proceed to later chapters,
we will define different models in communication complexity which will be
inspired by the data stream models that we will be defining later.
Two party communication complexity was first introduced in the sem-
inal paper by Yao [107] in 1979. In a two party communication prob-
lem, we have two players Alice and Bob who wish to compute a function
f : X × Y → Z. But Alice is only given x ∈ X and Bob is given y ∈ Y .
Note that the function f is known to both of them. Usually, we will con-
sider Boolean functions, i.e. Z = {0, 1}. Both Alice and Bob will need
to communicate between themselves according to some protocol P (which
depends on f) in order to compute the function f(x, y). P must specify
which player needs to communicate at the different stages of the protocol.
If the protocol terminates, the output should be f(x, y). At each stage,
the message from the player who needs to communicate depends on his (or
her) input and the messages exchanged from all the previous stages. Since
we are only interested in the amount of communication between Alice and
Bob, we allow them to have unlimited computational power.
Given a protocol P and input (x, y) ∈ X × Y , the cost of P on (x, y)
is the total number of bits communicated by Alice and Bob according to
P when Alice and Bob are given x and y respectively. We denote this by
11




which is just the worst case cost over all inputs. The deterministic commu-
nication complexity of a function f is the minimum cost over all protocols
that compute f correctly.
Now, we give a formal definition of this model. The following definition
closely follows [76].
Definition 2.2.1. A deterministic communication protocolP over domain
X × Y and range Z is a binary tree where each internal node v is labeled
either by the function Av : X → {0, 1} or by the function Bv : Y → {0, 1}.
Each leaf of this binary tree is labeled with an element z ∈ Z.
On input (x, y) ∈ X×Y , the value of the protocol is the label of the leaf
reached by starting from the root. For each internal node v of the binary
tree labeled with Av, move to the left child of v if Av(x) = 0, otherwise
move to the right child of v if Av(x) = 1. Likewise, for each internal node v
of the binary tree labeled with Bv, move to the left child of v if Bv(y) = 0,
otherwise move to the right child of v if Bv(y) = 1. On input (x, y), the
cost of the protocol is the length of the path taken starting from the root
to the corresponding leaf. The cost of the protocol P is the height of the
binary tree. The deterministic communication complexity of a function f
is the minimum cost over all protocols P that compute f correctly.
Let us consider an example to illustrate this formal definition. Consider
the following Boolean function f on X×Y , where X = {x0, x1, x2, x3} and
Y = {y0, y1, y2, y3}.
12
f y0 y1 y2 y3
x0 0 0 0 1
x1 0 0 0 1
x2 0 1 1 1
x3 0 0 0 0
Table 2.2.1: The function f computed by the protocol given in Figure 2.2.1.
The function f can be computed by the protocol given in Figure 2.2.1.
For example on input (x1, y3), Alice sends the first message to Bob. This
message is A1(x1) = 0. Next, Bob sends the bit B2(y3) = 1 to Alice and
they both conclude that f(x1, y3) = 1. The cost of the protocol on input
(x1, y3) is 2. The cost of the protocol is 3.
Figure 2.2.1: Protocol tree Pf .
In this thesis, we are mainly interested in randomized protocols which
output the correct answer with high probability. There are two variants
of such randomized protocols: the private coin model and the public coin
model. In the private coin model, Alice’s randomness is not known to Bob
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and vice versa. The coin flips are private, i.e. unknown to the other party.
In the public coin model, they have access to the same random string. An-
other way of looking at this is that the coin flips are public, so that Alice
and Bob get the same random string. One would agree that the private
coin model is a more realistic model. Newman [88] showed that for any
function f with T different inputs, if there is a protocol that requires c
bits of communication in the public coin model, there is a corresponding
protocol which requires c+ log log T +O(1) bits in the private coin model.
For the case where the inputs are drawn from {0, 1}n, the communication
complexity of a function f in the public coin model is only away from the
communication complexity of f in the private coin model by an additive
term of O(log n). For excellent introductions to communication complex-
ity, we refer the reader to the textbooks by Kushilevitz and Nisan [76] or
by Hromkovic [60]. For more advanced topics on different lower bound
techniques developed for communication complexity, we refer to [80,83].
The one-way communication complexity model is important for the
study of streaming algorithms for the purpose of proving space lower bounds.
In this model, there is a single message from Alice to Bob and Bob has
to output the answer based on Alice’s message. One-way communication
complexity was first introduced by Yao [107] and this subtopic of commu-
nication complexity was taken up in greater consideration by several other
authors (see e.g. [3, 33, 70, 75, 89, 90]). Given any randomized protocol P,
we say P computes a function f with error , if for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y ,
we have
Pr [P(x, y, r) 6= f(x, y)] ≤ 
where the probability is over r, the common random string that is generated
by the public coin. We denote the randomized one-way communication
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complexity of f in the public coin model by RA→B (f) which is the cost of
the best protocol that computes f with error at most . Usually, we will
take  = 1
3
and in this case, we will just omit . Note that if we start with a
protocol which computes f with error 1
3
, we can always reduce the error to
any  by repeating the protocol O(log(1/)) times and taking the majority.
The error analysis is a simple application of Chernoff’s inequality.
We define two functions, Index and Disj whose communication com-
plexity is well studied in the literature.
Definition 2.2.2. For the Index function, Alice is given x ∈ {0, 1}n and
Bob is given an index i ∈ [n]. The goal is for Bob to output xi with high
probability.
Definition 2.2.3. For the Disj function, both Alice and Bob are given
x, y ∈ {0, 1}n respectively. Disjn(x, y) is a Boolean function which is de-
fined to be 0 if and only if there exists i ∈ [n] such that xi = yi = 1. We can
also view this as follows: Alice and Bob each hold a subset of {1, · · · , n}
(x and y respectively). Disjn(x, y) = 1 if and only if x
⋂
y = ∅. If we drop
the subscript from Disjn, then for the purpose of this thesis, we will be
referring to the Disj function on n bits.
It is well-known that RA→B(Index) = Ω(n) [3, 75, 87]. For a simpler
and self contained proof using error correcting codes, the reader is referred
to [63]. On the other hand, if Bob is allowed to communicate with Alice
as well, Index can be solved with log n + 1 bits of communication. The
hardness of the Index function depends on the one-way model. Using the
lower bound on the one-way communication complexity of Index, it is easy
to see that RA→B(Disj) = Ω(n) as well. Given an instance (x, i) of Index,
where x ∈ {0, 1}n and i ∈ [n], Bob forms a n-bit string y which is zero on
all positions except the i-th position where it is one. They run the one-way
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Disj protocol on inputs (x, y). If the output is disjoint, Bob concludes that
xi = 0. Otherwise, he concludes that xi = 1.
The Disj function is the generic co-NP complete problem in commu-
nication complexity [8]. Even if multiple rounds of communication are
allowed between Alice and Bob and they are allowed to use randomization,
Disj still needs Ω(n) communication [66,94].
2.3 Frequency Moments
In this section, we state the main results of the seminal work of Alon,
Matias and Szegedy [6]. Given a stream σ = 〈a1, · · · , an〉, we define fi to
be the frequency of item i, i.e. fi := |{j | aj = i}| for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m. For









F0 is the number of distinct elements in a data stream. This quantity
has many application in areas such as query optimization, IP routing and
data mining (see the references cited in [67] for details). F1 is the length
of the stream, which is equal to n. This can be computed exactly using
O(log n) space. The quantity F2 is useful for computing certain statistical
properties of the data such as the Gini coefficient of variance [53].
Since one of the focuses of this thesis is the exact computation of F0
in different data stream models like the annotation and interactive models
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that will be defined in later chapters, for the sake of completeness, we show
a reduction from Disj to F0 to illustrate that the exact computation of F0
requires linear space. This illustrates how the rich theory of communication
complexity lower bounds is useful for showing lower bounds for streaming
algorithms.
Given a stream of length n ≤ 2m, suppose there is a streaming algo-
rithm A which uses s bits of space to compute the exact value of F0. We
show a communication protocol that solves Disj on m bits using s bits of
communication, where Alice holds x ∈ {0, 1}m and Bob holds y ∈ {0, 1}m
such that wt(x) = wt(y) = k for some k = Θ(m). Alice treats her input
as a subset of [m] whose characteristic vector is x and runs the stream-
ing algorithm A on this input. In particular, Alice treats her input as
a stream of length k and updates the memory content of A accordingly.
She communicates the content of the memory of A to Bob. Likewise, Bob
treats his input as a subset of [m] whose characteristic vector is y and
continue updating the memory of A . If the value of F0 = 2k, he outputs
that Disj(x, y) = 1 and if F0 ≤ 2k − 1, he outputs that Disj(x, y) = 0.
Indeed, this solves the Disj function using s bits of communication. It has
to be the case that s = Ω(m). On the other hand, it is easy to see that
one can compute the exact value of F0 using m bits of space. Initially, the
algorithm maintains a length m Boolean vector v initialized to the all zero
vector. Upon seeing an element j ∈ [m] on the stream, if vj = 0, it is
updated to 1. Otherwise if vj = 1, do not update it. The weight of v is the
exact value of F0.
For any nonnegative integer k 6= 1, given a stream of length n ≤ 2m,
any randomized algorithm that computes Fk exactly requires Ω(m) space.
This shows that the exact computation of Fk (k 6= 1) is hard under ran-
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domization. The next natural thing to do is to approximate the frequency
moments and see if this can be done in sublinear space. We require that
the streaming algorithm A outputs an estimate F̂k of Fk such that
Pr
[∣∣∣F̂k − Fk∣∣∣ ≤ Fk] ≥ 2
3
.
We call this a (1 ± )-approximation of Fk. When  is a constant (inde-
pendent of m and n), this is called a constant approximation of Fk. For
any nonnegative integer k, we say it is easy to approximate Fk if there is
a streaming algorithm which gives a constant approximation of Fk using
polylog(m,n) amount of space. Otherwise, we say it is hard to approximate
Fk.
Estimating F0 in the data stream model is well studied, beginning with
the work of Flajolet and Martin [40]. They gave a O(logm) constant
approximation algorithm for F0, but their algorithm requires access to a
perfectly random hash function. It is not known how to construct such
functions with limited space. This was then followed by a long line of
research which had improvements to both the lower and upper bounds [6,
13–15, 17, 25, 32, 35, 39, 47, 48, 61, 106]. Finally in 2010, Kane, Nelson and
Woodruff [67] gave an algorithm that computes a (1± )-approximation of
F0 using O(
−2 +logm) space. Due to the lower bounds in [6,61,106], their
algorithm is optimal as well.
Alon, Matias and Szegedy [6] gave an algorithm that computes a (1±)-






space. They also showed
that for any k ≥ 6, any randomized streaming algorithm which gives a






bits of space. This lower






for the space complexity of any
streaming algorithm which approximates Fk (k ≥ 3) up to a constant fac-
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tor [12, 18]. It is hence hard to approximate Fk for k ≥ 3.
We now mention the series of work done to obtain a tight upper bound
for the constant approximation of Fk for any constant k ≥ 3. In the seminal
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by Coppersmith and Kumar [26] and independently by Ganguly [45] us-







. In 2005, Indyk and Woodruff [62] made a breakthrough






upper bound which is optimal up to a factor of
polylog(m,n). Bhuvanagiri, Ganguly, Kesh, and Saha [16] gave an simpler
algorithm following the ideas from the work of Indyk and Woodruff [62],
improving the high constants and polylogaritmic factors present in [62].
2.4 Other Problems in the Streaming Model
Other than the frequency moments, there are many other problems
studied in the streaming model. We first introduce the Index problem in
the streaming context.
Definition 2.4.1. For the Index problem in the streaming setting, the
input stream is a1, · · · , an followed by an index i ∈ [n], where each ai ∈
{0, 1}. The goal is to output ai with probability at least 2/3. For the
Generalized Index problem in the streaming setting, ai is no longer
binary but is drawn from a universe of size m, i.e. ai ∈ [m].
Another important area is the study of streaming algorithms for graph
problems. For many important graph properties, it is known that it is
impossible to determine if the given graph has a certain property using
only a single pass over the stream and o(m) space [37], where m is the
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number of vertices of the graph. In view of this, many extensions of the
streaming model have been introduced. One is to allow multiple passes
over the input [58] and another is to consider a new model, which is called
the semi-streaming model [38], where the algorithm is allowed to use O(m ·
polylog(m)) bits of space. Zhang [109] has an excellent survey on streaming
algorithms for graph problems.
Other problems commonly studied in the data stream model include
matrix approximation problems like low rank approximation, deciding the
rank of a matrix etc. [24]. Problems related to the sortedness of a data




in Data Streams and
Merlin-Arthur Classes
We have seen in Chapter 2 that many interesting problems like fre-
quency moments Fk for k > 2 do not admit an efficient data streaming
algorithm. In this chapter, we will consider a more powerful model for
streaming. A third party is introduced who processes the stream and pro-
vides the answer together with a proof of correctness. We view the third
party as the helper/prover who convinces the client/verifier of the correct
answer. We will call the streaming model without the helper which was
introduced in Chapter 2 the standard streaming model.
In this chapter, we will formally define the model where we introduce a
helper to process the stream and give some protocols in this model. Like
almost all previously known lower bounds on data streams, we will see how
the Merlin-Arthur communication complexity model can be used to give
further insight on the prover-verifier streaming model.
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3.1 The Annotation Model
In this section we define the model of streaming computations with a
helper/prover.
In the annotation model we consider two parties, the prover, and the
verifier who wish to compute a function f(σ). Both parties are able to
access the data stream one element at a time, consecutively, and syn-
chronously, i.e., no party can look into the future with respect to the other
one.
The prover is a Turing machine that has unlimited workspace, and
processes each symbol in some time T (m,n) that will vary from problem
to problem. Ideally we want T (m,n) to be polylog(m,n) as well, but
this would imply immediately that the problem at hand can be solved
in quasilinear time which could be too restrictive for some problems like
computing the rank of a matrix.
After the stream has ended, the prover sends a single message to the
verifier claiming some particular value for f(σ) and the verifier now has
to verify this claim. The message that the prover sends to the verifier is
viewed as a stream and the verifier need not store this message. He can do
some computations with the message on the fly. The prover is said to have
annotated the stream. This model was first introduced by Chakrabarti,
Cormode, McGregor and Thaler [21] in 2009 and has been investigated
further in [20,28,102].
We define a valid protocol that verifies the correctness of some function
f(σ) in the annotation model. Our definition closely follows [21].
Definition 3.1.1. ( Annotation Model )
Before seeing the stream σ, both the prover P and verifier V agree on a
protocol to compute f(σ). This protocol should fix all the variables that
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are to be used (e.g. type of codes, size of finite fields etc.), but should not
use randomness to fix these variables.
After the stream ends, P sends V a single message. The message from
P to V need not be stored but can be treated and processed as a stream.
We denote the output of V on input σ, given V ’s private randomness R,
by out(V ,P ,R, σ). V can output ⊥ if V is not convinced that P ’s claim is
valid.
We say P is a valid prover or an honest prover if for all streams σ,
PrR [out(V ,P ,R, σ) = f(σ)] ≥ 1− δc.
We say V is a valid verifier for f if there is at least one valid prover P ,
and for all provers P ′ and all streams σ,
PrR [out(V ,P ′,R, σ) /∈ {f(σ),⊥}] ≤ δs.
δc is known as the completeness error, the probability that the honest
prover will fail even if he follows the protocol. If δc = 0, we say the protocol
has perfect completeness. δs is called the soundness error, that is no prover
strategy will cause the verifier to output a value outside of {f(σ),⊥} with




point onwards. By standard boosting techniques, these probabilities can
be made arbitrary close to 1 [7].
The main complexity measure of the protocol is the space requirement of
the verifier and the length of the message from the prover to the verifier. We
make the following definition which takes into account these complexities.
Definition 3.1.2. We say there is a (h, v) protocol that computes f in the
annotation model if there is a valid verifier V for f such that:
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1. V has only access to O(v) bits of working memory. (v is called the
verification cost.)
2. There is a valid prover P for V such that the length of the single
message from P to V is O(h) bits. (h is called the help cost.)
Given a protocol in the annotation model, we define its cost to be h+ v.
3.1.1 Basic Annotation Protocols
In this section, we give two basic annotation protocols. The first is a
(m log n, logm+log n) protocol in the annotation model for the exact com-





protocol for the Generalized Index problem. Both of these protocols
are based on simple fingerprinting techniques which we describe next.
We would like to have a fingerprint of a set such that we can check
equality with the same set even when the set is presented in a different
order. Given a multiset presented as a stream σ = 〈a1, · · · , an〉, where
each ai ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, we compute the multiset fingerprint of σ as follows:
F˜P q(r, σ) =
∏n
i=1 (r−ai) (mod q), where q is a prime chosen as described
below before the start of the streaming process and r is chosen uniformly
at random from Fq. If n is not known in advance, an upper bound on n
will suffice.
Lemma 3.1.3. Let q ≥ max{n/δ,m} be a prime for some given 0 < δ < 1
(we call 1 − δ the reliability of the fingerprint) and choose r uniformly
at random from Fq. Given a stream σ of length n where each symbol is
drawn from a universe of size m, the multiset fingerprint F˜P q(r, σ) can
be computed using O(logm − log δ + log n) bits of memory in a streaming
fashion with O(1) update time1. Let ς be a stream whose length is at most
1The update time is measured in the unit cost RAM model, see Section 2.1.
24
n where each symbol is drawn from a universe of size m. If ς 6' σ (the two
streams ς and σ are not equal as multisets), then the collision probability
Prr∈RFq
[
F˜P q(r, σ) = F˜P q(r, ς)
]
≤ δ.
If ς 6= σ, then F˜P q(X, σ) − F˜P q(X, ς) is an nonzero polynomial in X
of degree at most n. The proof of the collision probability in Lemma 3.1.3
is a simple application of the Schwartz-Zippel lemma which can be found
in Appendix A.1 of this thesis.
The prover can sort the stream and announce the frequencies of all the
items after the stream has ended. The verifier can check that the correct
frequencies of all the items were announced with high probability using the
multiset fingerprint in Lemma 3.1.3. This gives a (m log n, logm + log n)
protocol in the annotation model for the exact computation of Fk. If the
help is not present, i.e. h = 0, then the verification cost is m log n.
For the Generalized Index function, we need the fingerprint to be
variant under permutations. Given a stream σ = 〈a1, · · · , an〉 where each
ai ∈ [m], we define the vector fingerprint




i−1 (mod q). (3.1)
for some prime q.
Lemma 3.1.4. Let q ≥ max{n/δ,m} be a prime for some given 0 < δ < 1
(we call 1 − δ the reliability of the fingerprint) and choose r uniformly at
random from Fq. Given a stream σ of length n where each symbol is drawn
from a universe of size m, the vector fingerprint FP q(r, σ) can be computed
using O(logm − log δ + log n) bits of memory in a streaming fashion with
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O(1) update time2. Let ς be a stream whose length is at most n where each
symbol is drawn from a universe of size m. If ς 6= σ, then the collision
probability
Prr∈RFq [FPq(r, σ) = FPq(r, ς)] ≤ δ.
As in the case for Lemma 3.1.3, the bound on the collision probability
follows from the Schwartz-Zippel lemma.
For theGeneralized Index problem, the verifier partitions the stream
into
√
n blocks B1, · · · , B√n where Bi :=
(
a(i−1)√n+1, · · · , ai√n
)
. The veri-
fier computes the vector fingerprint with reliability 2/3 of each of the
√
n
blocks in a streaming fashion, using O(
√
n(log n + logm)) bits of mem-






from which the verifier can obtain ai. The soundness error of




n(log n + logm)) annota-
tion protocol for the Generalized Index problem. We note that for the
Generalized Index problem, any streaming algorithm in the standard
model requires Ω(n logm) space. To see this, consider the Index func-
tion on n logm bits. The simpler task of determining the bit of any index
i ∈ [n logm] requires Ω(n logm) space in the standard model [3, 75, 87].
Hence we can obtain cheaper protocols in the annotation model using sim-
ple fingerprinting techniques.
3.2 Frequency Moments Revisited in the An-
notation Model
In this section, we study the exact computation of the frequency mo-
ments in the annotation model. In Section 2.3, we showed that the exact
2In the more general turnstile model, the update time is O(log n).
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computation of Fk requires Ω(m) space in the standard streaming model
for k 6= 1. Almost all non-trivial protocols in the annotation model can be
viewed as modifying the Merlin-Arthur communication protocol of Aaron-
son and Wigderson [2] for the inner product function, which is based on
“arithmetization”. This was first observed by Chakrabarti, Cormode, Mc-
Gregor and Thaler [21] who used the idea to devise many interesting pro-
tocols in the annotation model. This line of approach to devise protocols
in the annotation model was used by several authors later [20,28,56].
3.2.1 Protocols for Frequency Moments
We begin by showing a protocol for computing the exact value of F2
in the annotation model. This protocol gives a tradeoff between the help
cost and the verification cost. The ideas for the protocol for the exact
computation of F2 given in Theorem 3.2.1 are the basic building blocks of
many other protocols in the annotation model.
Theorem 3.2.1. Let h, v ∈ Z+ such that hv ≥ m. There is a (h(log n +
logm), v(log n+ logm)) protocol that computes the exact value of F2 in the
annotation model.
Proof. Choose the smallest prime p > max{n2, 6h, v}. By Bertrand’s pos-
tulate, such a prime can be represented by O(log n+ logm) bits. We work
over the finite field Fp. Consider any injective map φ : [m] → [h] × [v].
Define the function f : [h]× [v]→ [n] such that for any (x, y) ∈ [h]× [v], if
there exists a z ∈ [m] such that φ(z) = (x, y), then f(x, y) = fz. Otherwise,
define f(x, y) = 0.
We consider the polynomial f˜ : F2p → Fp such that f˜(x, y) = f(x, y) for
all (x, y) ∈ [h]× [v]. We say f˜ is a low degree extension of f over the field
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Fp. f˜ is obtained by interpolation, i.e.


























∈ Fp[Y ] of degree at most v − 1.










Before observing the stream, V will choose r ∈ Fp uniformly at random.
As V observes the stream, he will compute f˜(r, y) for each 1 ≤ y ≤ v. This
can be computed in a streaming fashion due to the following observation:












Initially f˜(r, y) is zero for all 1 ≤ y ≤ v. As V observes a symbol a on
the stream, he computes φ(a) = (h∗, v∗) and updates f˜(r, v∗)← f˜(r, v∗) +
δh∗(r). Now it is clear that V can compute the values of f˜(r, y) for each
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1 ≤ y ≤ v in a streaming fashion using O(v(log n + logm)) space. After
the end of the stream, V will compute α := ∑vy=1 (f˜(r, y))2.







∈ Fp[X] of degree at most 2(h− 1).
The prover will define the polynomial s(X) by communicating {(i, s(i)) :
0 ≤ i ≤ 2h−2} using communication O(h(log n+logm)) bits. The verifier
will output F2 =
∑h
X=1 s(X) if s(r) = α. Note that F2 can be computed
in a streaming fashion given the representation of the polynomial s(X). It
is easy to see that s(X) =
∑2h−2





(X − k)/(i− k).
As a result, V can compute the value of s(r) in a streaming fashion
without having to store the polynomial s(X) explicitly.
It is clear that if the prover is honest, the verifier will always accept. On
the other hand, if the prover is dishonest, the verifier is fooled only if the
polynomial s˜(X) he receives does not represent s(X) but s˜(r) = s(r). By
the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma, the probability that this happens is at most
(2h− 2)/|Fp| < 1/3.
By choosing h = v =
√
m, we get an protocol for F2 in the annotation
model with cost O(
√
m(log n + logm)). It is easy to see that for any
constant k ≥ 2, there is an annotation protocol with cost O(√m(log n +
logm)) which computes Fk exactly. Now let us consider the problem of
computing F0 exactly in the annotation model. Using the notations and a
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g ◦ f˜(X, Y ). (3.2)
where g : N→ {0, 1} is a function which satisfies the following conditions:
g(0) = 0 and g(x) = 1 for 1 ≤ x ≤ n. Since g depends on n+ 1 points, the
degree of the polynomial g˜, obtained via interpolation, is at most n, where
g˜ agree with g on {0, 1, · · · , n}. If we were to use the approach in Theo-
rem 3.2.1 directly, this will cause the degree of the polynomial which is to
be communicated to be n(h− 1). The approach of Chakrabarti, Cormode,
McGregor and Thaler [21] was to reduce the degree of the polynomial g by
removing all the heavy hitters3 from the stream. As a result, they obtained
a
(
n2/3 log4/3 n, n2/3 log4/3 n
)
protocol for computing F0 exactly in the an-
notation model where m = Θ(n). For the case when m = Θ(n), we can also
obtain an protocol with the same cost using the ideas from Theorem 3.2.1
with a minor modification. The verifier divides the stream into n1/3 log2/3 n
intervals each of size n2/3/ log2/3 n. V stores all the elements in each in-
terval and remove all duplicates of that interval. V needs O(n2/3 log1/3 n)
space to do this. Now for the derived stream σ˜, F∞ ≤ n1/3 log2/3 n. For
v = O(n2/3 log1/3 n) and h = O(n1/3/ log1/3 n), we can use the approach of
Theorem 3.2.1 to verify the sum in (3.2), where the degree of g now is at
most n1/3 log2/3 n. The verification cost will be O(n2/3 log1/3 n · log n). The
degree of the polynomial communicated will be at most n1/3 log2/3 n·(h−1)
which gives a help cost of O(n2/3 log4/3 n).
Theorem 3.2.2. Assume that m = Θ(n). In the annotation model, there
is a (h, v) protocol which computes F0 exactly with h = v = n
2/3 log4/3 n.
3Those items whose frequencies exceed a fraction of n.
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Now, let us consider the case for the exact computation of F∞ in the
annotation model. Note that the verifier can use the Generalized Index
annotation protocol on (f1, · · · , fm, i) to output fi for any i ∈ [m]. In
particular, the verifier can obtain k := fi∗ in the annotation model with
cost O(
√
m(log n+logm)) where i∗ ∈ arg maxi fi is provided by the prover.
The verifier can hence be convinced that with high probability that F∞ ≥ k.






g ◦ f˜(X, Y ). (3.3)
where g : F → F is an interpolating polynomial such that g(x) = 0 for
x = 0, · · · , k and g(x) = 1 for x = k + 1, · · · , n. The approach used in [21]
was to reduce the degree of the polynomial g by removing all the items
in the stream whose frequencies exceed a certain threshold. The φ-heavy
hitters of a stream are all the items i ∈ [m] such that fi > φn for some
φ ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 3.2.3. [21]
Let h, v ∈ Z+ such that hv ≥ 2m − 1. There is a (h(log n + logm) +
1
φ
log2m, v(log n + logm)) protocol in the annotation model that identifies
all the φ-heavy hitters of the data stream.




O(n1/3/ log1/3 n) and v = O(n2/3 log1/3 n), we obtain a (n2/3 log4/3 n,
n2/3 log4/3 n) protocol in the annotation model which can identify all the
items in the stream whose frequencies exceed n1/3 log2/3 n. W.L.O.G., as-
sume that F∞ ≤ n1/3 log2/3 n. Both the verifier and the prover will check
the sum (3.3) in the annotation model in a similar fashion as Theorem 3.2.1,
where now the degree of g is low. In particular, g is the interpolat-
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ing polynomial such that g(x) = 0 for x = 0, · · · , k and g(x) = 1 for
x = k + 1, · · · , n1/3 log2/3 n.
Theorem 3.2.4. Assume that m = Θ(n). In the annotation model, there
is a (h, v) protocol which computes F∞ exactly with h = v = n2/3 log
4/3 n.
3.3 Merlin-Arthur Communication Models
In Section 2.2, we introduced the basic model of communication com-
plexity and showed that it is an important tool used to derive lower bounds
on the space needed by a streaming algorithm in the standard model. Simi-
larly, as we will see, the different Merlin-Arthur communication models can
be used to derive lower bounds for the prover-verifier data stream model.
As before, Alice and Bob are given x ∈ X and y ∈ Y respectively
and they need to compute the function f : X × Y → {0, 1}. Merlin-
Arthur communication complexity was first introduced by Babai, Frankl
and Simon [8] and was studied in greater detail by Klauck [71,72]. In this
model, there is an unreliable “super-player” called Merlin who knows the
entire input (x, y) and can help Alice and Bob (who together constitute
of Arthur) by interacting with them. The patterns in which Merlin and
Arthur interact give rise to distinct communication models. The different
communication models will be used to study the power and limitations of
different modes of data streaming algorithms with a prover.
We first begin with the standard MA model which was first introduced
in [8] before we look at other related models which are inspired by data
streaming algorithms.
Definition 3.3.1. ( MA Communication )
In a Merlin-Arthur (MA) protocol, Merlin sends a help message h(x, y)
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to Bob. After this, Alice and Bob communicate using public key ran-
domness (the proof cannot depend on the randomness). In other words,
after receiving the proof, Alice and Bob use a randomized protocol with
a public random string R to output a bit out(x, y,R, h(x, y)). We say
that the MA protocol P computes f with error δ if there exist a function
h : X × Y → {0, 1}∗ such that
1. If f(x, y) = 1, then PrR [out(x, y,R, h(x, y)) = 0] ≤ δc. (3.4)
2. If f(x, y) = 0, then ∀h′ ∈ {0, 1}∗, we have
PrR [out (x, y,R, h′) = 1] ≤ δs. (3.5)
We define the error δ := max{δc, δs}. For any MA protocol P which




and verification cost vcostδ(P) to be the maximum number of bits com-




hcostδ(P) + vcostδ(P) |P is a MA protocol which
computes f with error δ
}
,
and MA(f) := MA1/3(f) following standard notations.
It was shown by Klauck [71] that MA(Disj) = Ω(
√
n) which is almost
tight [2]. Furthermore, Aaronson and Widgerson [2] showed by a counting
argument that there exist functions f such that MA(f) = Ω(n), although
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no explicit construction of such a function is known.
In the MA model of communication complexity, Merlin first sends a help
message h(x, y) to Bob, who then uses public randomness to communicate
with each other. If Alice and Bob generate the public random string first
before Merlin sends them a message each, this is called the Arthur-Merlin
communication model. In this model, the help message that Merlin sends
depends on the randomness as well. Arthur-Merlin communication com-
plexity was first introduced by Babai, Frankl and Simon [8] which is the
natural communication complexity analogue of the Turing machine version
of AM [10].
Definition 3.3.2. ( AM Communication )
In an Arthur-Merlin (AM) protocol, Alice tosses a random coin r, which
is seen by both Bob and Merlin. Merlin sends a help message h(r, x, y)
to both Alice and Bob4. After this, Alice and Bob communicate using a
deterministic communication protocol to arrive at a Boolean output. Note
that Alice and Bob are not allowed to use any fresh randomness after
receiving the help message from Merlin.
Similar to the definition of the correctness of a MA protocol (See equa-
tions (3.4),(3.5)), we say that an AM protocol computes f correctly if for
every 1-input, there is a prover strategy such that with probability at least
2/3, the protocol accepts, and for every 0-input, no matter what Merlin’s
strategy is, the protocol rejects with probability at least 2/3. The cost of
such a protocol is the sum of the maximum length of the message sent by
Merlin and the maximum length of the communication between Alice and
Bob over all x, y, r. The complexity AM(f) is the cost of an optimal AM
protocol that computes f with error 1/3.
4In the model where Merlin can only send the help message to Bob, the cost only
differs by a constant factor as Alice and Bob are allowed to communicate.
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Note that Merlin can determine the exact transcript of Alice and Bob
after sending the help message. As such, Alice and Bob only need to
communicate one bit each after receiving Merlin’s message. This is because
Merlin can include the whole conversation between Alice and Bob in his
message, and they only need to check if the transcript is valid. We note
that there are no general methods known till date to establish non-trivial
AM lower bounds.
Figure 3.3.1 illustrates a MA communication protocol while Figure 3.3.2
illustrates an AM communication protocol.
Figure 3.3.1: MA communication protocol. The help message h depends
on x and y only. After Bob(B) receives h from Merlin(M), Alice(A) and
Bob communicate using a randomized protocol in the public coin model.
35
Figure 3.3.2: AM communication protocol. In this model, a random string
r ∈ R is drawn and known to all the three players. Merlin(M) then sends
Bob(B) the help message h, which depends on x, y and r. After this,
Alice(A) and Bob communicate using a deterministic protocol.
3.3.1 Online Merlin-Arthur Communication Models
For applications to the streaming model with a prover, we use a weaker
model where Alice can only communicate with Bob and Merlin can only
send his help message to Bob. This restricted version of the MA communi-
cation model is called the online MA model of communication complexity.
We allow Merlin and Bob to send k messages to each other, with Mer-
lin always sending the last message. Allowing Merlin and Bob to interact
is analogous to the case for streaming algorithms that allow the prover
and verifier to interact after the stream has ended. There are two main
variants of the interaction between Merlin and Bob. The first is what is
commonly known as the public-coin proof system (a.k.a. Arthur-Merlin
proof systems). The second is the general interactive proof system as de-
fined in [50].
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Definition 3.3.3. ( Online MA Communication with k messages )
In an online Merlin-Arthur protocol with k messages (OMAk protocol),
Alice receives input x, Bob receives input y and Merlin sees both inputs x
and y. Merlin and Bob exchange k messages in total, where Merlin always
sends the last message to Bob. Bob always replies to Merlin with a random
challenge, i.e. his response to Merlin does not depend on his input and is
just a sequence of random strings r1, · · · , rb k2c, which is revealed round by
round by a public coin and thus all three parties know the outcome of the
coin flips. After receiving the last message from Merlin, rb k2c+1 is generated
from the public coin and Alice sends Bob a message mA(x, r1, · · · , rb k2c+1 ).
After receiving all the messages from Merlin and Alice, Bob has to ac-
cept or reject. Note that rb k2c+1 is only generated after Merlin sends his
last message and hence this randomness can be viewed as hidden from
Merlin and only shared between Alice and Bob. Let h1, · · · , hdk/2e be the
messages sent by Merlin and r1, · · · , rbk/2c+1 be the random coin tosses gen-
erated by the public coin. The sequence of the conversation between Merlin
and Bob depends on whether an even or odd number of messages were ex-
changed between them. For the case where k = 2j− 1 is odd, the sequence
of messages is (h1, r1, h2, r2, · · · , hj−1, rj−1, hj, rj,mA(x, r1, · · · , rj)). Note
that in this case, h1 depends on x, y and for 2 ≤ i ≤ j, hi depends on
(x, y, h1, · · · , hi−1, r1, · · · , ri−1). Similarly for the case when k = 2j is even,
the sequence of messages is
(r1, h1, r2, h2, · · · , hj−1, rj, hj, rj+1,mA(x, r1, · · · , rj+1)), where h1 depends
on x, y, r1 and for 2 ≤ i ≤ j, hi depends on (x, y, h1, · · · , hi−1, r1, · · · , ri).
Let R = (r1, · · · , rbk/2c+1) and Bob’s output for the OMAk protocol
be outB
(
y,mA(x,R),R, h1, · · · , hdk/2e
)
. We say that the OMAk protocol
computes f if there exist functions h1, · · · , hdk/2e such that
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y,mA(x,R),R, h1, · · · , hdk/2e
)
= 1
] ≥ 1− c. (3.6)
2. If f(x, y) = 0, then ∀
(
h′1, · · · , h′dk/2e
)





y,mA(x,R),R, h′1, · · · , h′dk/2e
)
= 1
] ≤ s. (3.7)
The error of the protocol is the maximum of c and s. The help cost of
the protocol is |h1|+· · ·
∣∣hdk/2e∣∣+|r1|+· · · ∣∣rbk/2c∣∣ for the worst case instance
and the verification cost is defined as
∣∣∣mA(x, r1, · · · , rb k2c+1 )∣∣∣ + ∣∣rbk/2c+1∣∣
for the worst case instance as well. The cost of the protocol is the sum of
the help cost and verification cost. The complexity OMAk(f) is the cost
of an optimal OMAk protocol that computes f with error at most 1/3.
We note that for a k-round online MA protocol, the messages from Bob
to Merlin are random challenges, i.e. these messages neither depend on
Bob’s input nor Alice’s message. The next model is more general as it
allows Bob to send messages to Merlin based on his input and the message
sent by Alice.
Definition 3.3.4. ( Online IP Communication with k messages )
In an online interactive proof protocol with k messages (OIP k protocol),
Alice and Bob toss some coins first which are hidden from Merlin and Alice
sends Bob a message based on this shared hidden randomness RA,B. Then
Bob and Merlin interact as in an OMAk protocol but the messages from
Bob to Merlin depend on his input, the shared randomness between Alice
and Bob, and the history of previous messages from Merlin, but not on
Alice’s message to Bob.
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Similar to the definition of the correctness of an OMAk protocol (See
(3.6), (3.7)), we say an OIP k protocol computes f correctly if for every 1-
input, there is a prover strategy such that with probability at least 2/3, the
protocol accepts, and for every 0-input, no matter what Merlin’s strategy
is, the protocol rejects with probability at least 2/3. For any OIP k protocol
P which computes f with error 1/3, we define the verification cost to be
the worst case number of bits communicated by Alice to Bob plus the
length of RA,B and the help cost hcost(P) to be the maximum number of
bits communicated by Merlin and Bob over all x, y and the random string
RA,B. The cost of the protocol is the sum of the help cost and verification
cost. The complexity OIP k(f) is the cost of an optimal OIP k protocol
that computes f with error at most 1/3.
If Bob’s messages to Merlin also depend on Alice’s message, then we
denote the protocol by O˜IP k. As before, we denote O˜IP k(f) to be the
cost of the optimal O˜IP k which computes f correctly.
We illustrate the differences between the OMA2, OIP 2 and O˜IP 2 pro-
tocols in Figures 3.3.3, 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 respectively. For more details of
OMAk, OIP k and O˜IP k protocols, the interested reader is referred to [22].
39
Figure 3.3.3: OMA2 communication protocol. In this model, a random
string r1 ∈ R is drawn and known to all the three players. Merlin(M) then
sends Bob(B) the help message mM , which depends on x, y and r1. After
this, the second random string r2 ∈ R is drawn and Alice(A) sends Bob a
message mA, which depends on x, r1, r2. Bob is then required to produce
an output.
Figure 3.3.4: OIP 2 communication protocol. In this model, a random
string r ∈ R is drawn together by Alice(A) and Bob(B) only. Note that
Merlin(M) does not have access to r. After this, Bob sends Merlin a mes-
sage mB, which depends on y, r. Merlin replies Bob with a message mM ,
which depends on x, y,mB. Finally, Alice sends Bob a message mA, which
depends on x, r. Bob is then required to produce an output.
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Figure 3.3.5: O˜IP 2 communication protocol. In this model, a random
string r ∈ R is drawn together by Alice(A) and Bob(B) only. Note that
Merlin(M) does not have access to r. After this, Alice sends Bob a message
mA, which depends on x, r. Bob sends Merlin a messagemB, which depends
on y, r and mA. Finally, Merlin replies Bob with a message mM , which
depends on x, y,mB. Bob is then required to produce an output.
An OMA1 protocol is the same as a MA communication protocol except
that the communication from Alice to Bob is one-way. In a similar manner,
we can define the online version of Arthur-Merlin protocol.
Definition 3.3.5. ( Online AM Communication )
In an online Arthur-Merlin protocol (OAM protocol), Alice receives input
x, Bob receives input y, and Merlin sees both inputs x and y. Alice tosses
a random coin r (which is seen by Bob and Merlin), and sends a single
message mA(x, r) to Bob. Merlin then sends Bob a message h(x, y, r) and
Bob has to accept or reject without using any more randomness. We define
the correctness of the OAM protocol in a similar fashion as Definition 3.3.1,
i.e. for all inputs x, y such that f(x, y) = 1, there is a prover strategy such
that Bob will accept with probability at least 2/3, and for every inputs
x, y such that f(x, y) = 0, no matter what Merlin’s strategy is, Bob will
reject with probability at least 2/3. The cost of an OAM protocol is
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|r| + |mA(x, r)| + |h(x, y, r)| on the worst case instance. The complexity
OAM(f) is the cost of an optimal OAM protocol that computes f with
error 1/3.
Figure 3.3.6 illustrates an OAM communication protocol.
Figure 3.3.6: OAM communication protocol. In this model, a random
string r ∈ R is drawn and known to all the three players. Merlin(M) then
sends Bob(B) the help message h, which depends on x, y and r. Alice(A)
sends Bob a message mA, which depends on x, r. Note that in this set-up,
Merlin knows the content of Alice’s message to Bob. Bob is then required
to produce an output after receiving these two messages.
3.3.2 Communication Complexity Classes
Babai, Frankl and Simon [8] were the first authors to define commu-
nication complexity classes, which are natural analogs of the complexity
classes defined in the Turing machine world. We define the randomized
one-way communication complexity class as
RA→Bcc := {f : RA→B(f) = polylog(n)}.
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In a similar spirit, we can define communication complexity classes for the
different Merlin-Arthur models which we have defined till now. The classes
that we will refer to later in this thesis include
AMcc = {f : AM(f) = polylog(n)},
OMAkcc = {f : OMAk(f) = polylog(n)} and
OIP kcc = {f : OIP k(f) = polylog(n)}.
3.3.3 Lower Bounds for the Annotation Model
We have shown earlier in this chapter annotation protocols for F0, F2,
F∞ and Generalized Index. A natural question to ask is whether the
protocols that we gave for these problems can be further improved. The
natural model of communication complexity which corresponds to the an-
notation streaming model is the OMA1 model, where there is a single
message from Merlin to Bob. The following lower bound is known for this
communication model.
Theorem 3.3.6. [1, 21]
Suppose there is an OMA1 protocol which solves f with error at most 1/3,






Proof. The conclusion clearly holds when h = 0. For h ≥ 1, note that the
error probability can be reduced to 2−Ω(h) where the communication from
Merlin is still h bits and the message from Alice is hv bits now. We denote
this new protocol with error 2−Ω(h) by P.
Consider the following RA→B protocol which solves f with error 1/3.
Given Alice’s message in P, Bob loops over all 2h possible messages of
Merlin and accept if and only if there is a message that would cause him
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to accept. It is easy to see that if f(x, y) = 1, there exist a message
mM ∈ {0, 1}h such that Bob accepts with probability at least 1−2−Ω(h). If
f(x, y) = 0, by the union bound, the probability that there exist a string
from {0, 1}h that causes Bob to accept is at most 1/3. Hence it follows









. Since OMA1(f) ≤
RA→B(f), we have OIP 1cc = R
A→B
cc .
This idea of reducing the error probability first and then trying all pos-
sible proofs was first introduced by Aaronson [1]. For the Index function,
we have OMA1(Index) = Ω(
√
n). The annotation protocol that we gave
in Section 3.1.1 for Generalized Index shows that OMA1(Index) =
O(
√
n log n). This protocol can be modified to obtain a O(
√
n) upper
bound on the OMA1 complexity of the Index function [1]. For com-
pleteness sake, we briefly describe this protocol. As before, Alice will par-
tition her input x ∈ {0, 1}n into √n blocks B1, · · · , B√n where Bi :=(
x(i−1)√n+1, · · · , xi√n
)
. Instead of computing the vector fingerprint of each
of these
√
n blocks, she applies a linear error correcting code to each of
her blocks. In more details5, let G ∈ Mc√n,√n(F2) be the generator ma-













c > 1, 0 < α < 1. Alice picks k = O(1) indices τ1, · · · , τk ∈ {1, · · · , c
√
n}
uniformly at random and sends them to Bob. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ √n, Alice
computes zi := GB
T
i and sends (zi)τ1 , · · · , (zi)τk to Bob. Note that the
length of Alice’s message to Bob is O(
√
n). Given Bob’s index i ∈ [n],





to Bob which will enable
him to output xi. Due to the error correcting properties of C, the soundness
5The reader is referred to Appendix A.2 for the notations in coding theory that we
will be using in this thesis.
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error can be made to be 1/3 by an appropriate choice of the constant k.
As a result, we have OMA1(Index) = O(
√
n).
This shows that the lower bound in Corollary 3.3.7 is tight up to con-
stant factors. Since Justesen codes are linear and locally logspace con-










m), for any constant k ≥ 2, the anno-
tation protocol given in Section 3.2.1 for Fk is tight up to polylogarithmic
factors. For the case of the exact computation of F0 and F∞, there is a gap
between the best known streaming protocol and the lower bound.
How about approximating Fk in the annotation model? Chakrabarti,
Cormode, McGregor and Thaler [21] showed that any (h, v) streaming
protocol which approximates Fk up to constant factors in the annotation
model requires hv = Ω(m1−5/k). They obtained this lower bound by study-
ing the number-in-hand (NIH) multi-party Merlin-Arthur communication
complexity of a promise version of the Disj function. We note that the
same function was first introduced in [6] to study the space complexity of
approximating Fk in the standard streaming model.
In the NIH communication model, instead of having just two play-
ers (Alice and Bob), there are t players P1, · · · , Pt who wish to compute
a function f : X1 × · · · Xt → {0, 1} where Pi holds xi ∈ Xi. To compute
the joint function f(x1, · · · , xt), they need to collaborate with each other.
We are only interested in the amount of communication used to compute
the joint function. As such, all the players are assumed to have unlimited
computational power. There are three different variants of the NIH model,
depending on the mode of communication. They are
6See Appendix A.2 for the definition of locally logspace constructible.
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1. The blackboard model. Each player writes his message on a common
blackboard, visible to all the other players.
2. The message-passing model. Player Pi sends a message to another
player Pj.
3. The coordinator model. There is another player Pt+1 who does not
receive any inputs. In this context, Pt+1 is called the coordinator. All
the players can only communicate with the coordinator.
We can improve the lower bound given in [21] for approximating Fk in
the annotation model. To do so, we need to consider the NIH multi-party
one-way communication complexity model and the corresponding annota-
tion model. Each of the players has access to his own private randomness.
Of special interest to us will be the one-way communication model, which
is a restricted version of the NIH message-passing model. In this model,
Pi can only send a single message to Pi+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ t− 1. Note that the
message from P1 to P2 is m1(x1, r1), where r1 is the random string gener-
ated by P1. For 2 ≤ i ≤ t − 1, Pi sends a message mi(xi,mi−1, ri) to Pi+1
where ri is the random string generated by Pi. Pt will output the answer
based on his input, his private randomness and mt−1. Given a protocol
which computes f correctly, we define its cost to be |m1| + · · · + |mt−1|
on the worst case instance. We will denote the δ error one-way t-party
communication complexity of f by RP1→···→Ptδ (f), which is the cost of the
optimal protocol which computes f correctly with error δ.
Consider the multi-party unique disjointness function Disjm,t where for
1 ≤ i ≤ t, Pi holds the subset Ai ∈ [m] with the promise that either one of
the following is true:
1. Ai
⋂
Aj = ∅ for all i 6= j. (YES Instance.7)
7Disj evaluates to 1 on a YES instance and evaluates to 0 otherwise.
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2. There exist a x ∈ [m] such that Ai
⋂
Aj = {x} for all i 6= j. (NO
Instance.)
Disjm,t is a promise version of the Disj function. It is well known that
RP1→···→Pt1/3 (Disjm,t) = Ω(m/t) [18]. This result also holds in the blackboard
model [55].
We can also study the Disjm,t problem in the multi-party online Merlin-
Arthur model. The setup is similar to Definition 3.3.3.
Definition 3.3.8. ( Online MA Communication with t parties )
In an online Merlin-Arthur protocol with t parties (t-party OMA1 pro-
tocol), we have t players P1, · · · , Pt who wish to compute a function f :
X1×· · · Xt → {0, 1} where Pi holds xi ∈ Xi. Each of the players has access
to their own private randomness. Pi can only send a single message mi to
Pi+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ t−1. Merlin will send Pt a message mM . Note that Merlin
only knows the inputs of all the players but not the messages m1, · · · ,mt−1,
as these messages depend on the players randomness which is not known
to Merlin. Let R = (r1, · · · , rt) be the random string used where ri is the
randomness generated by Pi. Let outPt(xt,mM ,mt−1, rt) ∈ {0, 1} be the
output of Pt.
We say that the t-party OMA1 protocol computes f with error δ :=
max{δc, δs} if there exist a function mM : X1×· · ·×Xt → {0, 1}∗ such that
1. If f(x1, · · · , xt) = 1, then
PrR [outPt(xt,mM ,mt−1, rt) = 0] ≤ δc.
2. If f(x1, · · · , xt) = 0, then ∀m′M ∈ {0, 1}∗, we have
PrR [outPt(xt,m
′
M ,mt−1, rt) = 1] ≤ δs.
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Given a t-party OMA1 protocol, we define the help cost to be |mM | for
the worst case instance and the verification cost to be |m1| + · · · + |mt−1|
for the worst case instance as well.
A t-party OMA1 communication protocol is a natural generalization of
the OMA1 model where there are only two players, Alice and Bob (See
Definition 3.3.3).
Theorem 3.3.9. Suppose there is a t-party OMA1 protocol which computes
Disjm,t with error 1/3 where the help cost is h and the verification cost is
v. Then





Proof. The conclusion clearly holds when h = 0 [18]. For h ≥ 1, note
that the error probability can be reduced to 2−Ω(h) where the help cost
is still h bits and the verification cost being O(hv) bits now. This can
be done by getting P1 to Pt to repeat the verification process k = O(h)
times in parallel, using fresh randomness each time they do so. Pt will
receive k different messages m
(1)
t−1, · · · ,m(k)t−1 from Pt−1. For each message
m
(j)
t−1 that Pt receives, he will compute the output of the protocol using
the same message from Merlin and fresh randomness. Pt will accept if the
majority of these outputs resulted in acceptance, otherwise he will reject.
By standard Chernoff bounds, it is easy to see that the error probability
can be reduced to 2−Ω(h) by such a procedure. We denote this new protocol
with error 2−Ω(h), help cost h and verification cost hv by P.
Consider the following RP1→···→Pt protocol which solves f with error 1/3.
Given player Pt−1’s message in P, Pt loops over all 2h possible messages
of Merlin and accepts if and only if there is a message that would cause
him to accept. It is easy to see that if Disjm,t(A1, · · · , At) = 1, there exist
a message mM ∈ {0, 1}h such that Pt accepts with probability at least
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1−2−Ω(h). If Disjm,t(A1, · · · , At) = 0, by the union bound, the probability
that there exists a string from {0, 1}h that causes Pt to accept is at most





We now give a reduction from Disjm,t to approximating Fk [6]. Suppose
there exists a protocol P in the annotation model which gives a (1 ± )-
approximation of Fk for 0 <  < 1 with help cost h and verification cost
v. Let t = ((1 + c)m)1/k where c is chosen such that c > 2
1− . Given
an instance of Disjm,t, P1, · · · , Pt will simulate protocol P as follows. P1
will execute P on the elements of A1, passing the content of the memory
of P to P2, and so on and so forth. Finally, Pt will produce outP , the
output of the annotation protocol P on the input stream A1 ∪ · · · ∪At. If
outP ≤ m(1 + ), Pt will output 1, otherwise Pt will output 0.
Indeed, if Disjm,t(A1, · · · , At) = 1, then for the stream A1 ∪ · · · ∪ At,
Fk ≤ m and outP ≤ (1 + )m with probability at least 2/3. On the
other hand, if Disjm,t(A1, · · · , At) = 0, then Fk ≥ tk = (1 + c)m and
outP ≥ (1 − )(1 + c)m > (1 − )m with probability at least 2/3. This
gives us a t-party OMA1 protocol which computes Disjm,t where the help
cost is h and the verification cost is tv. As a result of Theorem 3.3.9, we






Corollary 3.3.10. For k ≥ 3, suppose there is a (h, v) annotation protocol
which gives a (1±)-approximation of Fk for some constant  ∈ (0, 1). Then
hv = Ω(m1−2/k).
We saw in Section 2.3 that it is easy to approximate F0 and F2 in the
standard streaming model. We remind the reader that F1 is simply the
length of the stream. For k ≥ 3, it is hard to approximate Fk in the
standard streaming model [6, 12,18].
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For any nonnegative integer k, we say it is easy to approximate Fk in the
annotation model if there exists a (h, v) annotation protocol which gives a
constant approximation of Fk such that h+ v = polylog(m,n). Otherwise,
we say it is hard to approximate Fk in the annotation model. Previously it
was known that for k ≥ 6, it is hard to approximate Fk in the annotation
model [21]. Prior to this thesis, it was an open problem whether it is easy
or hard to approximate Fk in the annotation model for k = 3, 4, 5.
For k ≥ 3, Corollary 3.3.10 shows that it is hard to approximate Fk in
the annotation model. For k ≥ 6, our lower bound in Corollary 3.3.10 is
only a polynomial improvement when compared to the lower bound pre-
sented in [21].
3.3.4 A Lower Bound for OMAk
In this subsection, we generalize the lower bound for the OMA1 com-
munication model given in Subsection 3.3.3. We will show a lower bound
for the online Merlin-Arthur communication complexity model with k mes-
sages. At this point, we will use a result by Babai and Moran [9] showing
that a constant number of rounds of interaction between the prover and
verifier can be reduced to one round (i.e., that the AM hierarchy collapses).
We need the following, more detailed statement for online Merlin-Arthur
protocols, which holds for all functions f .
Lemma 3.3.11. For any function f : X × Y → {0, 1}, we have
1. OMA2k−1(f) = Ω(OAM(f))1/(k+1).
2. OMA2k(f) = Ω(OAM(f))1/(k+1).
Proof. Assume we are given an online MA protocol with 2k − 1 messages
exchanged between Bob and Merlin. We will remove one round after an-
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other until we get a 1-round protocol, i.e. a protocol in which Alice, Merlin
and Bob share a public coin R, Alice sends one message to Bob, Merlin
sends one message to Bob such that if f(x, y) = 1, then with probability at
least 2/3 (over r), there is a message from Merlin that makes Bob accept,
while if f(x, y) = 0, then with probability at least 2/3, no matter what
Merlin sends, Bob will reject.
For a fixed input (x, y), let a denote the length of the message sent by
Alice. Let M1, · · · ,Mk be the messages that Merlin sends to Bob, where
M1 is the first message sent etc. We denote the length of the message Mi
by mi, i.e. |Mi| = mi for i = 1, · · · , k. Also, let R1, · · · , Rk be the random
strings generated by the public coin (Ri is generated after Mi has been
sent) and denote the length of Ri by ri, i.e. |Ri| = ri for i = 1, · · · , k. The
sequence of the messages is
( M1, R1,M2, R2, · · · ,Mk−1, Rk−1,Mk, Rk,MA(x, r1, · · · , rk) ) ,
where MA is Alice’s message to Bob. Then a +
∑k
i=1(mi + ri) ≤ c, where
c := OMA2k−1(f).
We first wish to reduce the error to 1/22mk . This can be done by
performing the whole procedure O(mk) times in parallel, i.e. after Merlin
sends the first message, Bob will send his message O(mk) times for different
random strings, Merlin will send his second message several times (each
time depending on the random strings chosen by Bob) etc. Note that
parallel repetition is not an issue here. By standard Chernoff bounds,
this decreases the error probability to 1/22mk . This increases the total
communication to O(mk c). We now have an OMA
2k−1 protocol which
computes f correctly whose error is 1/22mk and cost O(mk c).
Now consider the time after Mk has been sent. We change the protocol
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such that Bob sends Rk before Mk. Since |Mk| = mk, by the union bound,
the probability that there is a message Mk for Merlin that makes Bob
accept wrongly is at most 2−mk , even though Merlin knows Bob’s last
random string now. Now, we have a protocol whose message sequence
is
(
M1, R1, · · · ,Mk−2, Rk−2,Mk−1, R˜,Mk,MA
)
, where R˜ := (Rk−1, Rk).
Note that the error of this new protocol is 2−mk and the cost is O(mk c).
Next we reduce the error to 1/22mk−1 , again by parallel repetition. This
will increase the communication toO(mk−1mk c). Again, we can push Bob’s
last random choice one step ahead etc.
After k such steps, we end up with an OAM protocol which computes
f correctly and has cost O(m1m2 · · ·mkc) = O(ck+1).
For the case where 2k messages are exchanged between Merlin and Bob,
note that the message sequence is
(
R1,M1, R2,M2, · · · ,Mk−1, Rk,Mk, Rk+1,
MA(x,R1, · · · , Rk+1)
)
. A similar argument can be used to push Bob’s last
random choice one step ahead at a time, obtaining an OAM protocol which





We now proceed to give a lower bound for the online Arthur-Merlin
model.
Lemma 3.3.12. OAM(f) = Ω(RA→B(f)).
We omit the original proof of Lemma 3.3.12 which first appeared in [73].
Instead, we give a simplified proof which is less technical than the original
proof in [73].
Proof. (Simplified proof of Lemma 3.3.12.)
Suppose we are given an OAM protocol which solves f correctly with error
1/3 and whose cost is c. Let mA(x, r) be Alice’s message to Bob given
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the random string r. Note that |mA(x, r)| ≤ c. Let outB(y,mA(x, r), h) ∈
{0, 1} be Bob’s output given the help message h from Merlin, where |h| ≤ c.
The following is a one-way randomized communication protocol which
computes f with the same error and cost as the OAM protocol. Upon
receiving mA(x, r) from Alice, Bob will output f(x, y) = 1 if and only
if there exist an h ∈ {0, 1}c such that outB(y,mA(x, r), h) = 1. Indeed,
if f(x, y) = 1, then with probability at least 2/3 over r, there exist an
h ∈ {0, 1}c such that outB(y,mA(x, r), h) = 1. On the other hand, if
f(x, y) = 0, then with probability at least 2/3 over r, for all h ∈ {0, 1}c,
we have outB(y,mA(x, r), h) = 0. Hence, R
A→B(f) ≤ OAM(f).
For AM protocols, we note that a similar approach cannot be used to
remove Merlin. This is because for each help message from Merlin in an
AM protocol, Alice and Bob need to communicate to verify if the help
message is correct.







Proof. Combine Lemmas 3.3.11 and 3.3.12.
Corollary 3.3.14. OMAkcc = R
A→B
cc for k = O(1).
Proof. Since OMAk(f) ≤ RA→B(f), Corollary 3.3.14 is a simple conse-
quence of Theorem 3.3.13.
3.4 Merlin-Arthur and IP Streaming Model
Just as the OMA1 model was used to analyze streaming protocols in
the annotation model, developing lower bounds for the OMAk model can
be used to analyze streaming protocols where the prover and verifier are
allowed to interact. In particular, they are allowed to exchange k messages
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after the stream has ended, where the prover sends the last message in the
interaction. Similar to the discussion in Definition 3.1.1, we can define a
valid prover and a valid verifier.
Definition 3.4.1. We say there is a (h, v) streaming interactive protocol
(SIP) with r messages (r ≥ 2) that computes f , if there is a valid verifier
V for f such that:
1. V has only access to O(v) bits of working memory. (v is called the
verification cost.)
2. There is a valid prover P for V such that P and V exchange r messages
in total after the stream has ended with the prover sending the last
message and the sum of the length of the messages is O(h) bits. (h
is called the help cost.)
Sometimes, instead of writing a SIP with r messages, we will use the term
a SIP with r rounds. By such, we mean a SIP where at most 2r messages
are exchanged between the prover and verifier with the prover sending the
last message. Given any SIP, we define its complexity to be O(h+ v).
As before, there are two main variants of the interaction between the
prover and the verifier. This is analogous to the public-coin proof system
and the general interactive proof system which we defined for the online
Merlin-Arthur communication complexity models.
Definition 3.4.2. The verifier has access to his own private randomness.
Before seeing the stream, he generates all the randomness that he needs for
the streaming protocol. In a Merlin-Arthur streaming model, the verifier’s
messages to the prover are just some of his random bits. To be more precise,
suppose that the verifier has to send k messages to the prover according to
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some given protocol. In this case, the verifier will generate random strings
r1, · · · , rk and rV from a source of random bits before observing the stream.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the i-th message of the verifier to the prover is ri and rV is
the verifier’s private randomness that is not revealed to the prover.
In the IP streaming model, the messages from the verifier to the prover
are some function of his private randomness, the stream and the messages
received from the prover up to that point.
It is known that for the Turing machine model, the complexity classes8
IP kTM and AMTM are equivalent when k is a constant, i.e. IP kTM = AMTM
for k = O(1) [9,51]. For standard communication complexity classes (where
both Alice and Bob can communicate with each other) as defined in [8],
Lokam [82] observed that the classes IP kcc and AMcc behave the same way
as the corresponding classes in the Turing machine model, i.e. IP kcc = AMcc
for k = O(1).
Surprisingly, in a recent work by Chakrabarti, Cormode, McGregor,
Thaler and Venkatasubramanian [22], it was shown that there is an ex-
ponential separation between the Merlin-Arthur and IP streaming model.
Chakrabarti et al. [22] showed that if the verifier’s message to the prover de-
pends on the stream and his private randomness, then Index can be solved
with just 2 messages exchanged and the cost of the streaming protocol
which does this is O(log n log log n). Before we provide the details of their
construction, let us see why it is not possible to use the Goldwasser-Sipser
transformation [51] to convert any IP streaming algorithm to a Merlin-
Arthur streaming algorithm, while increasing the space complexity and
communication only polynomially and increasing the number of rounds by
only 2. The main tool used to prove that for Turing machines, Arthur-
8See Appendix A.3 for the definitions of IP kTM and AMTM.
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Merlin protocols can be used to simulate protocols in the IP model with
just a polynomial blowup in cost is the Goldwasser-Sipser set lower bound
protocol (see Chapter 8.2 in [7]). Following the set lower bound protocol
as described in [7], the verifier has to randomly pick a hash function h
from a pairwise independent hash family and a value y randomly from the
codomain of h. The prover replies with r such that h(r) = y and the correct
messages, which will lead the verifier to accept given his private random-
ness was r. But the verifier has no way to check this, as the value of r
is given after the stream has ended. In summary, the Goldwasser-Sipser
transformation does not work because of the online nature of streaming
protocols.
A simple consequence of Theorem 3.3.13 is that Index cannot be solved
by any streaming algorithm in the Merlin-Arthur model with polylog(n)
cost, requiring only constant number of messages to be exchanged be-
tween the prover and verifier. For completeness sake, we provide the
IP streaming protocol which solves Index with just 2 messages and cost
O(log n log log n). A similar problem called the Retrieval problem was stud-
ied by Raz in [92] and the protocol presented here is a simple extension of
Raz’s idea to the streaming setting. We note that this was first observed
by Chakrabarti et al. [22].
Given x ∈ {0, 1}n, define fx : [n] → {0, 1} such that fx(i) = xi for any
i ∈ [n]. We can also interpret each fx : {0, 1}logn → {0, 1} by associating
each i ∈ [n] with its binary expansion. Let d = log n and choose the
smallest prime p ≥ 3 log n + 1. Let F := Fp and f˜x : Fd → F be the low
56
degree extension of fx over F which is given by
f˜x (Z1, · · · , Zd) :=
∑
v∈{0,1}d
fx(v)χv (Z1, · · · , Zd) where
χv (Z1, · · · , Zd) :=
d∏
j=1
[(2vj − 1)Zj + (1− vj)] .
It is easy to see that f˜x(Z1, · · · , Zd) is a polynomial of total degree at most
d, i.e.






1 · · ·Zαdd .
where cα1,··· ,αd ∈ F. The verifier chooses r ∈ Fd uniformly at random
and computes f˜x(r1, · · · , rd) in a streaming fashion, where the update time
is O(log n) per symbol seen on the stream. Upon observing the index
i∗ ∈ Fd on the stream9, the verifier computes b := µ(r − i∗) for some
µ ∈ F∗ chosen uniformly at random. The verifier sends b to the prover and
this defines the line L := {i∗ + λb | λ ∈ F} ⊆ Fd. The prover sends the
polynomial f˜x restricted on the line L to the verifier, i.e the verifier receives
g(λ) := f˜x(i
∗
1 + λb1, · · · , i∗d + λbd) ∈ F[λ] whose degree is at most d. The
verifier computes g(0) and g(µ−1) and outputs g(0) as the answer if g(µ−1)
agrees with the fingerprint f˜x(r1, · · · , rd).
It is easy to see that this protocol has perfect completeness. For the case
of the dishonest prover, if the polynomial g˜ sent is not identically equal to
the polynomial g in the honest case, then by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma,
Prr∈RF∗ [g˜(r) = g(r)] ≤ d/(|F| − 1) ≤ 1/3. The cost of the protocol is
O(d log |F|) = O(log n log log n). It is important to note that the message of
the verifier to the prover depends on the stream and his private randomness.
9The index i∗ ∈ [n] can be thought of as an element of Fd by associating it with its
binary expansion, where d = log n.
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Theorem 3.4.3. [22]
The Index streaming problem can be solved in the IP streaming model with
2 messages exchanged and cost O(log n log log n). In the Merlin-Arthur
streaming model, there is no protocol which can solve Index with a constant
number of messages and cost polylog(n).
Corollary 3.4.4. For any constant k ≥ 1, OIP 2cc * OMAkcc.
The IP streaming protocol for Index can be used to design constant
message protocols for various query problems like Median and pattern
matching queries [22]. One may wonder if we can obtain constant message
protocols for more general streaming problems like frequency moments. To
do so, we need to study the O˜IP k communication complexity model. It
is known that for any constant k > 0, there exist a constant 0 < βk ≤ 1




[22]. Although proving a superlog-
arithmic lower bound on the AM complexity of Disj is wide open, it is
widely believed that it is unlikely that AM(Disj) = polylog(n) since Disj
is the generic co-NP complete problem in communication complexity [8].
Hence, constant message protocols for exact Fk (k 6= 1) with polyloga-
rithmic complexity probably do not exist, but the current techniques in
communication complexity (which fail to provide strong lower bounds on
the AM communication complexity of Disjointness) are not sufficient to
prove this.
3.5 Related Results
In this section, we give a brief summary of other related work in the
annotation model and some recent results for online Merlin-Arthur com-
munication complexity classes.
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Graph problems on n nodes which is determined by m edges which ap-
pear on the stream was first studied in [21] in the annotation model. They
studied graph problems like counting the exact number of triangles in a
graph and to decide if a given graph is bipartite. By designing a generic
protocol in the annotation model for the linear programming problem, Cor-
mode, Mitzenmacher and Thaler [28] gave annotation protocols for graph
problems like shortest s− t path and the minimum weight bipartite perfect
matching problem.
The cost of the annotation protocols for Index and Fk given in this
thesis are sublinear in m, the size of the universe. One may also consider
designing annotation protocols for sparse data sets, i.e. n m. In such a
case, ideally the cost of the annotation protocol should be sublinear in n
instead of m. Chakrabarti, Cormode, Goyal and Thaler [20] were the first
authors to give annotation protocols for Index, Disj and Fk where the
cost is sublinear in n. They considered the sparse version of Index and
showed that for this problem, it is just as hard to solve in the annotation
model as compared to the standard streaming model. More concretely,
they considered the Indexlogn function where Alice is given x ∈ {0, 1}n
whose Hamming weight wt(x) = log n and Bob is given an index i ∈
[n]. It was shown in [20] that OMA1(Indexlogn) = Ω(log n). Consider
Indexlogn as a streaming problem (See Definition 2.4.1). It is easy to
see that Indexlogn can be solved in the standard streaming model with
space O(log n) via standard hashing techniques10. We briefly sketch this
algorithm. Before observing the stream, the verifier chooses h : [n] →
[3 log n] from a family of pairwise independent hash functions. The space
10The authors in [20] showed that RA→B(Indexlogn) = O(log n log log n). This is
because they used a hash function that has the property that it is injective on {i | xi = 1}
with high probability. This is necessary for the sparse disjointness problem, which the
authors also studied but not for Indexlogn.
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needed to store this hash function is O(log n) (See Section 8.4 in [85] for a
standard construction of such a hash function). Let z ∈ {0, 1}3 logn be the
indicator vector such that zi = 1 if and only if there exists a 1 ≤ j ≤ n
satisfying xj = 1 and h(j) = i. It is clear that the verifier can update the
vector z in a streaming fashion with O(1) update time. Upon observing
the index i∗ ∈ [n], the verifier outputs 1 if and only if zh(i∗) = 1. It is
easy to see that the error of this streaming algorithm is 1/3. This was
the first explicit example that was known in the literature which shows
that certain streaming problems are just as hard in the annotation model
as they are in the standard streaming model. Recently, Thaler showed
that for the connectivity and bipartiteness streaming problems in the XOR
update model, any protocol in the annotation model can only be cheaper by
at most a polylogarithmic factor from the cost of any streaming algorithm
in the standard model [102]. The results also holds for dense graphs, unlike
the previous example for Index which only holds for the sparse instance.
For the Turing machine based complexity class IP kTM which is defined
in Definition A.3.1, it is well known that this class collapses to the second
level [9, 51], i.e. IP kTM = IP
2
TM for any constant k ≥ 2. A similar result
holds for the corresponding communication complexity class which was first
pointed out by Lokam [82]. For the online version of the communication
complexity class, the situation is slightly different as OIP kcc collapses to the
fourth level. In particular, it was shown in [22] that
OIP 1cc ( OIP 2cc ( OIP 3cc ( OIP 4cc = OIP kcc = AMcc (3.8)




In Chapter 3, we studied the annotation streaming model where we
showed that for functions like Index and Fk, it is not possible to obtain
protocols with polylog(m,n) complexity. For streaming interactive proto-
cols (SIP) where a constant number of messages are exchanged between the
prover and verifier, we saw that problems like Index have protocols with
polylog(n) cost but it is conjectured that for harder problems like Disj and
Fk, this is not possible. The purpose of this chapter is to study SIP with
polylog(m,n) rounds of interaction between the prover and verifier.
4.1 Generic Protocol for NC
Let us begin by defining the complexity class NC (Nick’s class). We
refer the reader to [49] for a definition of Boolean circuits and the functions
computed by them.
Definition 4.1.1. A family of circuits is LOGSPACE-uniform if the de-
scription of the nth circuit can be generated by a Turing machine in O(log n)
space.
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Definition 4.1.2. The complexity class NC is the class of languages that
can be recognized using LOGSPACE-uniform families of finite fan-in cir-
cuits with depth polylog(n) and size nO(1).
Goldwasser, Kalai and Rothblum [52] proposed a delegation interac-
tive protocol for any language that can be computed by NC circuits. Their
protocol is efficient in the sense that the communication complexity is poly-
nomial in the depth of the circuit rather than its size and the running time
of the verifier is linear in the input and polynomial in the depth. Cor-
mode, Thaler and Yi [30] were the first authors to observe that the result
of Goldwasser, Kalai and Rothblum [52] can be extended to the stream-
ing setting, which will give efficient streaming protocols for any problem
in NC. Their protocol was presented formally in the streaming setting by
Cormode, Mitzenmacher, and Thaler [29]. We will refer to this generic
interactive protocol given below as the GKR protocol in this thesis.
Theorem 4.1.3. [Theorem 3.1 from [29]]
Let f : F→ F be a function that can be computed by a family of O(logS(n))-
space uniform arithmetic circuits1 (over F) of fan-in 2, size S(n) and
depth d(n). Then in the streaming model with a prover, there is a protocol
for f which requires O(d(n) logS(n)) rounds such that the verifier needs
O (logS(n) log |F|) bits of space and the total communication between the
prover and the verifier is O (d(n) logS(n) log |F|).
It is easy to see that for any fixed finite field, arithmetic circuits can
simulate Boolean circuits with only a constant factor loss in both size and
depth. The standard transformation of a Boolean circuit into an arithmetic
circuit can be found in [43].
1See [49] for more details on arithmetic circuits.
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It follows from Theorem 4.1.3 that if f is in NC, there is a SIP with
cost polylog(m,n) which computes f requiring polylog(m,n) rounds of
interaction. The main tool used to construct the SIP is the sum check
protocol of Lund, Fortnow, Karloff and Nisan [84].
Lemma 4.1.4. [Sum Check Protocol of Lund et al. [84] ]








g (x1, · · ·xq) (4.1)
for some h ∈ F. There is an interactive protocol with q rounds which ac-
cepts (4.1) with perfect completeness and the soundness error is at most
qd/|F|.
We assume that for any (r1, · · · , rq) ∈ Fq, g(r1, · · · , rq) can be evaluated
efficiently. The total communication between the prover and verifier is
(q +
∑q
i=1 degi(g)) log(|F|), where degi(g) denotes the degree of g in vari-
able i.
For a detailed description of the sum check protocol and the proof of
soundness, the reader is referred to Chapter 8 of [7]. Alternatively, the
reader can refer to Theorem 4.2.3 or Section 5.2 for the details of the sum
check protocol.
The sum check protocol is applied to the d(n) different layers of the
circuit in Theorem 4.1.3, giving a protocol in the Merlin-Arthur streaming
model. For a succinct overview of the GKR protocol as well as the technical
details of the proof of Theorem 4.1.3, the reader is referred to the full version
of [101]. Due to the nature of the sum check protocol, the communication
between the prover and verifier can only begin after the whole stream is
seen. The running time of the prover was shown to be O(S(n) logS(n))
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in [29] which was improved by Thaler [101] to O(S(n)) for a large class of
circuits.
4.2 An Online Merlin-Arthur Protocol for
PSPACE cc
Definition 4.2.1. The class of decision problems that are solvable in poly-
nomial space is denoted by PSPACETM .
Shamir [96] proved that any language which is in PSPACETM has an
interactive proof system, and a simplified proof was later given by Shen [97].
In this section, we show that Shen’s proof can be adapted to give an on-
line Merlin-Arthur communication protocol for any function in PSPACEcc,
the communication complexity analogue of PSPACETM which we define
in Definition 4.2.2. We note that it is not always the case that any trans-
formation that works for Turing machines should carry over to online com-
munication complexity classes. In particular, for Turing machines, by us-
ing the Goldwasser-Sipser transformation [51], we can convert any inter-
active proof protocol which uses private coins into one which uses public
coins only, by adding at most two rounds and only incurring a polynomial
blowup in complexity. Lokam [82] observed that a similar result hold for
the non-online communication complexity counterpart2. As we have seen
in Corollary 3.4.4, we have OIP 2cc * OMAkcc for any constant k ≥ 1. This
shows that the Goldwasser-Sipser transformation does not carry over to
online communication.
Similar to the notion of alternating Turing machines, Babai, Frankl and
2For the non-online version of Merlin-Arthur communication complexity, Alice and
Bob are allowed to communicate with each other. As an example, the AM protocol in
Definition 3.3.2 is the non-online version of the OAM protocol in Definition 3.3.5.
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Simon [8] also defined the notion of alternating communication protocols
which gives rise to the complexity class PSPACEcc.
Definition 4.2.2. Let l1(n), · · · , lk(n) be nonnegative integer such that
l(n) :=
∑k
i=1 li(n). We say that a PSPACE protocolP correctly computes
f : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1} if there exist l1(n), · · · , lk(n) and Boolean
functions ϕ, ψ : {0, 1}n+l(n) → {0, 1} such that
f(x, y) = 1⇐⇒ ∃u1∀u2 · · ·Qk uk [ϕ(x, u)♣ψ(y, u)]
where ui ∈ {0, 1}li(n), u = u1 · · ·uk, Qk is the existential (∃) or universal (∀)
quantifier if k is odd or even respectively and ♣ represents ∨ if k is even
and
∧
if k is odd. The cost of P is l(n) and PSPACE(f) is the cost
of the optimal protocol which computes f correctly. We define the class
PSPACEcc to be the collection of all functions f which can be computed
by a PSPACE protocol of cost at most polylog(n).
Any function f which has a PSPACE communication protocol with
cost c can be written in the following form:
f(x, y) = 1⇐⇒ Q1v1Q2v2 · · ·Qc vc [ϕ(x, v)♣ψ(y, v)]
where vi ∈ {0, 1}, v = v1, · · · , vc, Qi ∈ {∃,∀} and ♣ ≡
∧
if Qc ≡ ∃.
Otherwise, if Qc ≡ ∀, then let ♣ ≡
∨
.







In Theorem 4.2.3, we adapt the proof techniques of [96, 97] to show that
PSPACEcc ⊆ OMApolylog(n)cc .
Theorem 4.2.3. Suppose f : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1} can be computed by
a PSPACE protocol with cost c. Then there exist an OMAc2+3c protocol P
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which computes f correctly where vcost(P) = O(c) and hcost(P) = O(c3).
The completeness and soundness error of P is 2−Ω(c).
Proof. We need to derive an OMA protocol to check if the formula
Q1v1Q2v2 · · ·Qc vc [ϕ(x, v)♣ψ(y, v)] (4.2)
is true for some Boolean functions ϕ, ψ : {0, 1}n+c → {0, 1} if and only if
f(x, y) = 1. Let ϕ˜ : Fc → F, ψ˜ : Fc → F be the multilinear extension of
ϕ, ψ to a finite field F, whose size will be decided later. That is,
ϕ˜(x, v1, · · · , vc) =
∑
z∈{0,1}c
ϕ(x, z)χz(v1, · · · , vc)
where χz(v1, · · · , vc) :=
∏d
i=1 [(2zi − 1) vi + (1− zi)]. Given x and y, define
Px,y(v1, · · · , vc) := ϕ˜(x, v1, · · · , vc) ♣˜ ψ˜(y, v1, · · · , vc) where
a ♣˜ b :=

ab if ♣ ≡ ∧
a+ b− ab if ♣ ≡ ∨ .
To check whether the formula in (4.2) is true, it is equivalent to checking
the following identity:





vi∈{0,1} if Qi ≡ ∃∏
vi∈{0,1} if Qi ≡ ∀.
There are two main obstacles with this approach. The first is that the
value of k can be as large as 22
c
. Alice and Bob randomly choose a prime
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p ∈ {2c, · · · , 2O(c)} using their shared randomness. Since k can have at
most 2c distinct prime factors, by the Prime Number theorem3, it follows
that the probability that k = 0 (mod p) is at most 2−Ω(c). We work over
the finite field F = Fp.
The second obstacle is that if we were to use the sum check protocol, the
degree of the polynomial that needs to be communicated can be as large as
2c. Since we are only evaluating the polynomial Px,y on the Boolean cube,
following Shen’s technique [97], we define the following linearization oper-
ator Li in variable i as follows: Given any g(X1, · · · , Xc) ∈ F[X1, · · · , Xc],
let
Li g(X1, · · · , Xc) :=Xi · g(X1, · · · , Xi−1, 1, Xi+1, · · ·Xc)
+ (1−Xi) · g(X1, · · · , Xi−1, 0, Xi+1, · · ·Xc).
It is easy to see that whenever Xi ∈ {0, 1}, then the two polynomials Li g
and g are equivalent. Merlin has to prove that over F,
Q˜1L1 Q˜2L1L2 · · · Q˜cL1 · · ·Lc Px,y(v1, · · · , vc) 6= 0.
Protocol 4.2.1 shows how the sum check protocol can be used to give an
OMA protocol for the following identity:
♦1 · · · ♦R Px,y(v1, · · · , vc) = k 6= 0 (mod p) (4.3)




vj∈{0,1} or Lj for some
1 ≤ j ≤ c. It is easy to see that if Merlin is honest, the protocol rejects





suffices for most computer science applica-
tions, where pi(x) is the prime-counting function that gives the number of primes between
1 and n. For a proof of this weaker statement, the reader is referred to Theorem A.23
in [7].
67
1. Alice and Bob randomly choose a prime p ∈ {2c, · · · , 2O(c)}.
Bob sends this prime p to Merlin.
2. (i) If ♦1 =
∑
vj∈{0,1}, then Merlin sends the polynomial
f(V ) = ♦2 · · · ♦R Px,y (v1, · · · , vj−1, V, vj+1, · · · , vc)
to Bob. Bob checks if f(0) + f(1) = k.
(ii) If ♦1 =
∏
vj∈{0,1}, then Merlin sends the polynomial
f(V ) = ♦2 · · · ♦R Px,y (v1, · · · , vj−1, V, vj+1, · · · , vc)
to Bob. Bob checks if f(0) · f(1) = k.
(iii) If ♦1 = Lj, then vj has already been set to rj before. In
this case, Merlin sends the polynomial
f(V ) = ♦2 · · · ♦R Px,y (v1, · · · , vj−1, V, vj+1, · · · , vc)
to Bob. Bob checks if rj · f(1) + (1− rj) · f(0) = k.
3. Bob chooses a ∈ Fp uniformly at random and Bob and Merlin
recursively check whether
f(a) = ♦2 · · · ♦R Px,y(v1, · · · , vj−1, a, vj+1, · · · , vc).
4. In the last round, Merlin and Bob need to check that
β = LcPx,y(r1, · · · , rc−1, γ)
for some β which is known to both Bob and Merlin. Merlin
sends Bob the polynomial f(V ) = Px,y (r1, · · · , rc−1, V ). Alice
sends ϕ˜(x, r1, · · · , rc) to Bob.
Bob accepts if γ · f(1) + (1− γ) · f(0) = β and
f(rc) = Px,y(r1, · · · , rc) for a randomly chosen rc ∈ F.
Protocol 4.2.1: An OMA protocol which establishes (4.3).
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with probability at most 2−Ω(c). By the union bound, since the degree of
the polynomial communicated at each round is at most 2, the soundness
error is at most O(c2/|F|). The total communication between Merlin and
Bob is at most O(c3) as the polynomial communicated at each round has
degree at most two.
In the last round, Merlin sends Bob the polynomial
f(V ) = Px,y(r1, · · · , rc−1, V ) and Bob only would need to check if f(rc) =
Px,y(r1, · · · , rc) for a randomly chosen rc ∈ F. Alice has to send the value
ϕ˜(x, r1, · · · , rc) to Bob in order for Bob to be able to evaluate Px,y(r1, · · · , rc),
which gives an O(c) verification cost of this protocol.
It follows from Theorem 4.2.3 that PSPACEcc ⊆ OMApolylog(n)cc . We
denote the non-online version4 of an OMAk protocol by MAk (Merlin-
Arthur protocol with k messages). Following the notations in Chapter 3,
we can define the communication complexity class MAkcc to be the col-
lection of all functions that can be computed by a MAk protocol with







Lokam proved that MA
polylog(n)
cc ⊆ PSPACEcc [82]. Note that trivially
OMA
polylog(n)





It is known that NC ⊆ PSPACEcc [82]. As a result, we have NC ⊆
OMA
polylog(n)
cc , i.e. any problem which is decidable by circuits of size poly-
nomial in n and depth polylogarithmic in n can be computed by a on-
line Merlin-Arthur protocol with polylog(n) messages and whose cost is
polylog(n).
4Please see the footnote on page 64.
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4.3 Practical Interactive Protocols
For most functions in NC (like frequency moments), the GKR protocol
is not optimal for practical purposes. In most cases, the GKR protocol
requires O(log2m) rounds of interaction between the prover and verifier
which may be large enough to be offputting. Cormode, Thaler and Yi [30]
gave logm round protocols with polylog(m,n) complexity for many other
interesting problems including F2, Inner product and Range-sum, which
they argued are more practical than the generic GKR protocol as they
require less interaction between the prover and verifier. In an article in
Forbes [41] in 2013, it was reported that the National Security Agency’s
data center in Utah will be capable of storing a yottabyte5 of data. For a
yottabyte-sized input, this corresponds to about 80 rounds of interaction if
one uses a protocol with logm rounds. For a protocol with log2m rounds,
more than 6000 rounds of interaction are needed. The reader is referred
to [29] for the experimental evaluations of the GKR protocol and the im-
proved interactive protocol with logm rounds when used to compute the
exact value of F2. It is evident from their experimental evaluations that
the improved interactive protocol with logm rounds improves the prover’s
running time and the total communication between the prover and the
verifier.
Let us briefly describe the polylog(m,n) cost SIP which uses logm
rounds to compute the exact value of F2. Let f : [m]→ [n] be the frequency
function, i.e. for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m, f(i) is the frequency of item i on the
stream. In a natural way, we can view f : {0, 1}logm → [n]. Choose the
smallest prime p > max{n2, 6 logm} and let F := Fp. Let f˜ : Flogm → F
5One yottabyte is 1024 bytes.
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be the low degree extension of f over F which is given by
f˜(X1, · · · , Xlogm) :=
∑
v∈{0,1}logm
f(v)χv(X1, · · · , Xlogm) where
χv(X1, · · · , Xlogm) :=
logm∏
j=1
[(2vj − 1)Xj + (1− vj)] .







f˜ 2(x1, · · · , xlogm).
Applying the sum check protocol, we get a SIP with logm rounds which
computes the exact value of F2. Note that the total communication is
O (logm log(|F|)) and the soundness error is at most 2 logm|F| < 1/3. The
verifier needs to compute f˜(r1, · · · , rlogm) for a randomly chosen r ∈ Flogm
which can be computed in a streaming fashion as in Theorem 3.2.1. The
space required by the verifier is O (logm log(|F|)).
Theorem 4.3.1. [30]
There is a (logm(log n + log logm), logm(log n + log logm)) SIP in the
Merlin-Arthur streaming model with logm rounds that computes the exact
value of F2. This protocol has perfect completeness and the update time for
the verifier per symbol received is O(logm).
The SIP for the exact computation of F2 can be modified to give SIPs
with logm rounds for other interesting problems like higher order frequency
moments, Inner Product and Range-sum. For more details, the reader is
referred to [30].
In the work of [30], the authors gave SIP with logm + 1 rounds, poly-
logarithmic space and O˜(
√
n) help cost for the exact computation of F0
and F∞. Let us first describe the logm + 1 round protocol of [30] for the
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exact computation of F0. As we have seen in Chapter 3, applying the sum
check protocol to (3.2) naively will result in the degree of the polynomial
that is communicated at each round to be n. Similar to what we did in
Chapter 3, we will remove the heavy hitters from the stream. We note that
the verifier need not store all the heavy hitters in his memory.
Lemma 4.3.2. There is a (φ−1 logm(logm+log n) , logm(logm+log n) )
SIP with logm+ 1 rounds in the Merlin-Arthur streaming model that iden-
tifies all the φ-heavy hitters in a data stream. This protocol has perfect
completeness.
Proof. Consider a binary tree T of depth logm where the value of the i-th
leaf is fi. For any node v ∈ VT, denote L(v) to be the set of leaves of
the subtree rooted at v and let p(v) be the parent of v. For every node
v ∈ VT, we denote its value by f̂(v) :=
∑
i∈L(v) fi. We denote the witness
set W ⊆ VT which consists of all leaves l with f̂(l) > T and all nodes v
which satisfy f̂(v) ≤ T and f̂(p(v)) > T . This witness set ensures that
no heavy hitters are omitted by the prover. Label the nodes of T in some
canonical order from {1, 2, · · · , 2m−1}. Let x ∈ {0, 1}2m−1 be the indicator
vector for W , i.e. xj = 1 if and only if the j-th node of T belongs to W .
The prover gives the set W together with the claimed frequency f ∗(w) for
each w ∈ W . If w /∈ W , then define f ∗(w) = 0. The verifier needs to check
that the set W does cover the whole universe and that f ∗(w) = f̂(w) for








The sum check protocol applied to (4.4) will require logm + 1 rounds of
interaction. We have to choose a prime q > (2m − 1)n2 which will re-
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quire O(log n+ logm) bits to represent q. At each level of the binary tree,
there can be at most 2φ−1 nodes that belong to W , which implies that
|W | = O(φ−1 logm). In each round of the sum check protocol, the prover
communicates a polynomial of degree at most 3. Hence the total commu-
nication is dominated by O(φ−1 log2m+ φ−1 logm log n).
The verifier need to pick a random point r ∈ Flogm+1q and needs to evaluate
x˜(r), f˜ ∗(r) and ˜̂f(r), where x˜, f˜ ∗ and ˜̂f are the low degree extensions of
x, f ∗ and f̂ respectively. As described in [30], x˜(r), f˜ ∗(r) and ˜̂f(r) can be
calculated in a single pass over the stream. Hence the space complexity of
the verifier is O(logm(logm+ log n)).
Theorem 4.3.3. [30]
There is a (
√
n logm(logm+log n) , logm(logm+log n) ) SIP with logm+
1 rounds that computes the exact value of F0 in the Merlin-Arthur streaming
model. This protocol has perfect completeness.
Proof. The verifier removes all the φ-heavy hitters from the stream with the
help of the prover. This gives rise to a new stream σ˜ where the frequency







g˜ ◦ f˜ ′(x1, · · · , xlogm). (4.5)
where f ′ : {0, 1}logm → [φn] is the frequency function of the derived stream
σ˜, g : N→ {0, 1} is given by g(0) = 0 and g(x) = 1 for 1 ≤ x ≤ φn and f˜ ′
and g˜ are the low degree extensions of f ′ and g respectively. We can work
over the finite field Fq, where q is chosen in Lemma 4.3.2. The sum check
protocol on (4.5) requires logm rounds of interaction which will give a total
communication of O(φn(logm + log n) logm). The space required by the
verifier is O(logm(logm+ log n)). Note that the heavy hitter protocol and
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the sum check protocol on (4.5) can be carried out in parallel. By choosing
φ = 1√
n
, we get Theorem 4.3.3.
For the case of the exact computation of F∞, we also have to use the
heavy hitters protocol to remove all the items with high frequency from
the stream. By a simple generalization of the 2 message IP streaming
protocol for the Index problem, one can construct a protocol with cost
O(logm(log n + log logm)) which will convince the verifier that F∞ ≥ b
where only three messages6 are exchanged between the prover and verifier.
In the case of an honest prover, b is the exact value of F∞. If b ≥
√
n,
then they execute the b
n
-Heavy Hitter protocol to check that they are no
items with frequency larger than b in the data stream. On the other hand,
if b <
√
n, by executing the 1√
n
-Heavy Hitters protocol, the verifier can
remove all the items whose frequencies are larger than
√
n. This gives rise
to a new stream σ˜ where the frequency of each element is at most
√
n. The







g˜ ◦ f˜ ′(x1, · · · , xlogm). (4.6)
where f ′ : {0, 1}logm → [√n ] is the frequency function of the derived
stream σ˜, g : N → {0, 1} is given by g(x) = 0 for x = 0, · · · , b and
g(x) = 1 for x = b+ 1, · · · ,√n and f˜ ′ and g˜ are the low degree extensions
of f ′ and g respectively.
Theorem 4.3.4. [30]
There is a (
√
n logm(logm+log n) , logm(logm+log n) ) SIP with logm+
1 rounds that computes the exact value of F∞. This protocol has perfect
completeness.
6The “index” i ∈ [m] such that fi = F∞ has to be provided by the prover, which
adds one more message to the protocol.
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Cormode et al. [30] posed the problem of finding SIPs with polyloga-
rithmic space and communication and O(logm) rounds for the exact com-
putation of F0 and F∞. Cormode, Mitzenmacher, and Thaler [29] gave
an alternative interactive protocol for F0 based on linearization, whereby
the prover is more efficient in terms of running time. Their protocol still
requires log2m rounds of interaction where the verifier’s space is O(log2m)




Streaming Algorithm for F0
As we have seen in Chapter 4, if we use the GKR generic protocol to
compute the exact value of F0, it will require O(log
2m) rounds of inter-
action which can very quickly become impractical. In this chapter, we
give a logm round protocol which computes the exact value of F0 with
polylog(m,n) cost. This improves the logm round protocol for the exact
computation of F0 given in Theorem 4.3.3.
5.1 Overview of Our Techniques
Instead of removing the heavy hitters from the stream which we did in
Section 4.3, we write F0 as a different formula. Such an approach was first
used by Gur and Raz [56] to obtain a protocol for the exact computation of
F0 in a slightly modified form of the annotation model where the prover and
verifier are allowed to flip public coins before observing the stream. Here,
the main technical point is to replace the OR polynomial on n variables
which has high degree with an approximating polynomial over a smaller
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finite field Fq, so that this new polynomial has low degree. Such approxi-
mating polynomials were first constructed in [93,99] to prove circuit lower
bounds. The degree of the approximating polynomial p : Fnq → Fq depends
on q. But choosing q to be small forces us to work over the field Fq and the
arithmetic will be correct only modulo q, i.e. F0 will be calculated modulo
q. Note that we cannot choose q > m as the approximating polynomial
degree would then be larger than m. By using the smallest logm primes,
we can compute F0 modulo these logm many primes with the help and
verifier’s cost being polylogarithmic in m and n. This does not increase
the number of rounds because all these executions can be done in parallel.
The exact value of F0 can be constructed by the Chinese Remainder The-
orem. As a result of decreasing the degree of the polynomial, our protocol
no longer has perfect completeness. By parallel repetition, the probability
that an honest prover succeeds can be made close to 1.
We will make heavy use of the Gur and Raz technique [56] to devise
a logm round protocol with polylog(m,n) cost for the exact computa-
tion of F0. Our main contributions are using the sum check protocol (See
Lemma 4.1.4) on the formula for F0 used by Gur and Raz [56] and showing
that in this setup, the verifier can compute the value of a certain polynomial
at any point in a streaming fashion.
5.2 The Algorithm
Given a multiset presented as a stream σ = 〈a1, · · · , an〉, where each
ai ∈ [m], we give a interactive protocol with logm rounds which computes
F0 exactly. For each j ∈ [m] and i ∈ [n], we denote χi(j) to be the element
indicator of element j at position i of the stream, i.e. χi : [m]→ {0, 1} such
that χi(j) = 1⇔ ai = j. We can also interpret each χi : {0, 1}logm → {0, 1}
77















ORn (χ(x1, · · · , xd)) ,
where d = logm, χ : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}n is
χ(x1, · · · , xd) := (χ1(x1, · · · , xd), · · · , χn(x1, · · · , xd))
and ORn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is the OR function on n variables.
Let us consider the low degree extension of χi over a larger field. Let
q be a prime and λ be an integer to be determined later. We extend










i , · · · , a(d)i
)




→ Fqλ is given by













Note that χ˜i(x1, · · · , xd) = χi(x1, · · · , xd) for all x ∈ Fd2. Similarly,




in the natural way:








ORn (χ˜(x1, · · · , xd)) . (5.2)
Applying the sum check protocol naively to (5.2) would require the
prover to send a degree n polynomial in each round. We replace the OR
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function in (5.2) with a low degree polynomial p chosen from a probability
distribution over polynomials such that p approximates the OR function
with high probability. This idea was first introduced in [93, 99] and was
also used in [56] to obtain a protocol for exact F0 in the slightly modified
form of the annotation streaming model where the prover and verifier are
allowed to flip public coins before observing the stream.
Definition 5.2.1. Let p : Fn → F be a polynomial over a field F. We say
that the individual degree of p is at most d in each variable if






1 · · ·Xαnn .
where cα1,··· ,αn ∈ F.
Lemma 5.2.2. Using O(L log n) bits of randomness, we can construct a
random polynomial p : Fnq → Fq of individual degree at most L(q − 1) in
each variable, such that for every x ∈ {0, 1}d,
Pr [p (χ˜(x1, · · · , xd)) = ORn (χ˜(x1, · · · , xd))] ≥ 1− 1
6m logm
,








Proof. Start with a [ζn, n, 1
3
ζn]q-linear code C, where ζ > 1 is a constant to
be chosen such that C exists1. Let G be the generator matrix of C. Choose
uniformly at random α1, · · · , αL ∈ [ζn] where L is the least integer that
1Justesen codes [65] are one example of a family of codes which have both constant
relative distance and constant rate.
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satisfies (5.3) and define







It is easy to see that the individual degree of p is at most L(q − 1) in each
















We note that L = O(logm). Since Fqλ can be viewed as a vector space
over Fq, we can view p : F
n
q → Fq as p˜ : Fnqλ → Fqλ , by applying p
componentwise. By the union bound, the probability that
Pr





p˜ (χ˜(x1, · · · , xd))




We first give an interactive protocol to compute F0 (mod q) with high
probability. Let q ≤ 2 logm log logm+ 2 be a prime and λ be the smallest
integer such that qλ−1 ≥ 6Ld logm. Before observing the stream, the
prover and verifier agree on the code C as in Lemma 5.2.2. The verifier
chooses O(L log n) random bits to define the polynomial p˜ and sends this
randomness to the prover. The verifier chooses randomly r ∈ Fd
qλ
and
computes p˜ (χ˜(r1, · · · , rd)) in a streaming fashion. We now illustrate how
the verifier computes p˜ (χ˜(r1, · · · , rd)) given a one-pass over the stream
without storing the whole input.




i , · · · , y(λ)i
)
where yi = χ˜i(r1, · · · , rd) and
each y
(j)
i ∈ Fq for 1 ≤ j ≤ λ. Each yi can be computed when ai is seen on
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the stream using (5.1). Then































 for any 1 ≤ j ≤ λ in a streaming










































This can be done given one pass over the stream σ. Each time V observes a
new entry ak, he updates Bij ← Bij+y(j)k ·gαi,k. Note that the computation
of y
(j)
k depends only on ak and the verifier need not store matrix G. Upon
observing entry ak, only the α1, · · · , αL entries of the k-th column of G
are relevant. Since G is locally logspace constructible, each gαi,k can be




























After the stream ends, the verification protocol proceeds in d rounds to
compute F0 (mod q) with probability at least 1− 16 logm . In the first round,







p˜ (χ˜1 (X1, x2, · · · , xd) , · · · , χ˜n (X1, x2 · · · , xd)) .
The polynomial g1(X1) has degree L(q − 1) which can be described in
O(Lq log qλ) bits. The verifier need not store g1(X1) but just need to com-
pute g1(r1), g1(0) and g1(1), which can be done in a streaming fashion.
Note that if the prover is honest, then
F0 (mod q) = g1(0) + g1(1). (5.6)
In round 2 ≤ j ≤ d−1, the verifier sends rj−1 to the prover who then sends







p˜(χ˜1 (r1, · · · , rj−1, Xj, xj+1, · · · , xd) , · · ·
· · · ,χ˜n (r1, · · · , rj−1, Xj, xj+1, · · · , xd)).
(5.7)
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The verifier computes gj(rj), gj(0) and gj(1) and proceeds to the next round
only if the degree of gj is at most L(q − 1) and gj−1(rj−1) = gj(0) + gj(1).
In the final round, the verifier sends rd−1 to the prover who then sends
the polynomial gd(Xd), which is claimed to be
gd(Xd) = p˜ (χ˜1 (r1, · · · , rd−1, Xd) , · · · , χ˜n (r1, · · · , rd−1, Xd)) .
The verifier only accepts that (5.6) is computed correctly if gd is of the
correct degree, gd−1(rd−1) = gd(0) + gd(1) and gd(rd) = p˜ (χ˜(r1, · · · , rd)).
Next, we show that if the prover is dishonest, the verifier will reject the
claimed value of F0 (mod q) with high probability.
Lemma 5.2.3. In the case of the honest prover, the verifier will accept the









p˜ (χ˜(x1, · · · , xd)) (5.8)
correctly represents F0 (mod q) and if the prover cheats by sending some
polynomial which does not meet the requirements of the protocol, the verifier
will accept with probability at most L(q−1)d
qλ
.
Proof. In the case of an honest prover, since the interactive protocol always
evaluates (5.8) correctly, the prover will fail in the case that the approx-
imating polynomial p˜ does not represent the OR function. By (5.4), the
probability that the honest prover will fail is at most 1
6 logm
.
For the case of the dishonest prover, the argument proceeds inductively
from the d-th round to the first round. Indeed, if gd is not as claimed, by
the Schwartz-Zippel lemma,




By induction, suppose for 1 ≤ j ≤ d− 1 that the verifier is convinced that
gj+1(Xj+1) is correct with high probability. He can verify the correctness







p˜(χ˜1 (r1, · · · , rj, Xj+1, xj+2, · · · , xd) , · · ·
· · · ,χ˜n (r1, · · · , rj, Xj+1, xj+2, · · · , xd)),




gˆj(rj) = gj+1(0) + gj+1(1)
]









p˜(χ˜1 (r1, · · · , rj−1, Xj, xj+1, · · · , xd) , · · ·
· · · ,χ˜n (r1, · · · , rj−1, Xj, xj+1, · · · , xd)).







p˜ (χ˜1 (X1, x2, · · · , xd) , · · · , χ˜n (X1, x2 · · · , xd))
such that either in some round j + 1 (for some 1 ≤ j ≤ d − 1), when the
verifier reveals rj, it should satisfy
gˆj(rj) = gj+1(0) + gj+1(1)
or gˆd(rd) = p˜ (χ˜(r1, · · · , rd)) in the final round. By the union bound,





Analysis of space and communication. We now analyse the space
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needed by the verifier and the total communication between the prover
and verifier over the logm rounds to verify F0 (mod q). First, let us look
at the space complexity of the verifier. He needs to store α1, · · · , αL which
will take O(logm log n) bits of space. With O(logm · log logm · log q) bits of
space, the verifier can compute p˜ (χ˜(r1, · · · , rd)) when observing the stream.
Note during the interaction with the prover after the stream ends, at each
round 1 ≤ j ≤ d, the verifier need not store the polynomial gj(Xj) but
only needs to evaluate gj at a constant number of points. Hence, the space
complexity of the verifier is O ( logm [ log n+ log logm · log q ]) bits.
We now bound the total communication between the prover and ver-
ifier. The verifier needs to communicate α1, · · · , αL and r1, · · · , rd−1 to
the prover, with cost O(logm log n) and O(logm log logm) respectively.
The prover, who needs to send g1(X1), · · · , gd(Xd), uses O(dLq log qλ) =
O(q log2m · log logm) bits to communicate all these polynomials. Hence,
the total communication is O ( logm (log n+ q logm · log logm)) bits. We
summarize our result below.
Lemma 5.2.4. There exists a (h, v) SIP with logm rounds with
h = logm (log n+ q logm · log logm) ,
v = logm ( log n+ log logm · log q )
that computes F0 (mod q) for any prime q ≤ 2 logm log logm + 2, where








Computing F0 exactly. Lemma 5.2.4 gives us a streaming interactive
protocol to verify the correctness of F0 (mod q) with high probability for
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any prime q ≤ 2 logm log logm+2. Now, we show how the prover can verify
F0 with high probability. Let Q = {q1, · · · , qlogm} be the first logm primes.
Note that qlogm ≤ 2 logm log logm+2 for all m ≥ 2 [11] and
∏logm
i=1 qi > m.
So, the verifier will compute F0 (mod qi) for i = 1, · · · , logm. Note that
this can be done in parallel and will cause the working space of the verifier
and the total communication to increase, but the number of rounds is still
logm. By using the Chinese remainder theorem, the verifier can compute
F0 exactly given F0 (mod qi) for i = 1, · · · , logm. By the union bound,
the completeness and soundness error are 1/6 and 1/3 respectively.
In the preprocessing phase (even before seeing the data), the verifier
and prover agree on a constant ζ > 0 such that the linear codes Ci :=
[ζn, n, 1
3
ζn]qi exist for all 1 ≤ i ≤ logm. Note that the same α1, · · · , αL
can be used to define the polynomial p˜i : F
n
qλi
→ Fqλi for each 1 ≤ i ≤ logm.









. The space needed to store r(i) for
1 ≤ i ≤ logm is O(d log qλi · logm) = O(log2m log logm). The space
















log2m · (log logm)2) ,
where we used the fact that
∑
p : p is prime
and p≤x
log p = Θ(x) [11]. Hence, the
total space used by the verifier is O(logm ( log n+ logm · (log logm)2 )).
To bound the total communication, we need the following fact: Let
pn be the n
th prime. Then it is known that
∑n
i=1 pi = Θ(n
2 log n) for all
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n ≥ 2 [11]. Hence, the total communication is
O
(







logm log n+ log4m · (log logm)2) .
Running time of the verifier. First, we analyze the processing time of
each symbol seen in the stream. We suppose it takes unit time to add and
multiply two field elements from Fqλ . For each symbol ak seen, the verifier




where r(q) ∈ Fd
qλ
for each q ∈ Q. From (5.1),





for each q ∈ Q. Hence the total time taken by the verifier to
process each symbol is O(log2m). After this, the verifier can discard ak and
only needs to update matrices B for each q ∈ Q. In a separate work space,









is computed, the updating of B does
not require ak anymore.
We summarize our results.
Theorem 5.2.5. There exists a (h, v) SIP with logm rounds with
h = logm
(
log n+ log3m · (log logm)2 ) ,
v = logm
(
log n+ logm · (log logm)2 )
that computes F0 exactly, where the completeness and soundness error are
1/6 and 1/3 respectively. The update time for the verifier per symbol re-
ceived is O(log2m).
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5.3 Comparison of Our Results
We compare our results with previously known non-interactive and in-
teractive protocols that compute F0 exactly. For comparison purposes, we
assume that m = Θ(n). The results are collected in Table 5.3.1.
Paper Space Total Communication Rounds
[21] m2/3 logm m2/3 logm 1




Our work log2m(log logm)2 log4m (log logm)2 logm
Table 5.3.1: Comparison of our protocol to previous protocols for comput-
ing the exact number of distinct elements in a data stream. The results
are stated for the case where m = Θ(n). The complexities of the space and
the total communication are correct up to a constant.
We note that if we fix the number of rounds to logm, our work improves









while only increasing the verifier’s space by a multiplicative factor of
(log logm)2.
Gur and Raz studied the exact computation of F0 in a more general
annotation model where the prover and verifier are allowed to flip public
coins before observing the stream [56]. In this streaming model, they gave





A New Model for Verifying
Computations on Data
Streams
In this chapter, we define a new model for data streaming algorithms
that employ a prover/helper to outsource difficult computations in a ver-
ifiable way. While for the verifier the usual time (per symbol read) and
space constraints of the data streaming model are in place, the prover has
unbounded space. Neither party can look into the future (i.e., they do not
know data arriving later). As we have seen in the previous chapters of this
thesis, prior work on such models [20, 21, 28–30, 56, 74, 102] either severely
restricted the total communication between the prover and the verifier, or
extended the computation by a long annotation that has to be streamed
from the prover to the verifier oﬄine after the original stream has ended,
delaying the computation of the result.
We will investigate a streaming model that only bounds the communi-
cation overhead, i.e., the amount of communication sent from the prover
to the verifier per symbol of the data stream. This allows for vastly more
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communication between the prover and verifier while maintaining the online
nature of the model (in particular long annotations sent after the stream
has ended are not allowed).
6.1 Motivation
In this chapter, we propose to relax the restriction on the total com-
munication placed in previous works. We believe this to be an unnatural
restriction. In fact, since the data stream does not usually originate with
the provider processing it (the prover), giving the prover access can be
understood as uploading of data. In practice, uploading speed for most
internet users is smaller by some factor than downloading speed. So why
should the length of the messages from the prover be restricted massively?
We find it more natural to restrict the communication overhead, i.e., the
amount of communication exchanged per symbol on the data stream. In
short, while the user/verifier uploads a symbol, he should also be able to
download the next chunk of a proof, potentially even a constant factor
larger than the coding length of the symbol. Furthermore, as we have seen
in the previous chapters, interactive proofs are known to be much more
powerful than noninteractive proofs in most scenarios, so the user/verifier
might as well upload short questions to the helper/prover.
What can we hope to gain from this relaxation of the model? First of all,
in the model allowing only polylogarithmic total communication between
the prover and the verifier, it is known that all functions in NC can be
computed efficiently (see Chapter 4). So we might hope to find algorithms
for problems not known to be in NC. Beside this, the generic protocols for
NC functions are complex and often not well tuned to specific problems.
One might wish for simpler and more efficient algorithms. Furthermore
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there is the following bottleneck in the algorithms described in [29, 30,
74]. Their algorithms are based on the sum check protocol and involve
an additional verification phase after the stream has ended (or, once an
output is required). This verification phase is quite short (polylogarithmic
rounds and communication), but is in fact the only communication between
the prover and verifier performed at all. This implies that all the work of
the prover that depends on random challenges sent from the verifier must
essentially be done during this phase, i.e., a computation that is at least
linear in the size of the stream (and often worse) must be squeezed into this
short phase, in which no new inputs arrive, and the verifier is no more busy
than usual. This leads to a huge computation bottleneck for the prover,
which we hope to address with our model. Essentially in previous protocols,
the prover is almost completely idle before the onset of the verification
phase, and then has to crank up his machines to perform exponentially
more operations than the verifier during the verification phase. We will
also investigate whether for all functions in NC, is it possible to avoid the
additional verification phase after the stream has ended. This is a natural
question to ask.
6.2 The New Model
For simplicity, in this chapter, we will consider m and n such that
logm = Θ(log n) where, as in the previous chapters, m is the size of the
universe and n is the length of the stream.
Both the prover and verifier observe the stream in an online fashion,
i.e. the prover does not know the input stream beforehand. The verifier
is a Turing machine that has space bounded by polylog(n) and processes
each symbol in time polylog(n). The prover, on the other hand is a Turing
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machine that has unlimited workspace, and processes each symbol in some
time T (n) that will vary from problem to problem. In our model, both
the prover and verifier have access to their own private randomness. This
seems necessary in the online case as the prover does not know the whole
input beforehand. Indeed, we do require the verifier to run in total time
n · polylog(n), and the prover to run in time n · T (n), but we furthermore
require this time to be spread out evenly.
Both the prover and verifier can communicate, under the following re-
strictions. For each symbol seen (i.e., right after that symbol ai has ap-
peared on the stream), the verifier and prover can exchange O(1) messages,
each of length C(m,n) · logm, where C(m,n) = O(1) in general. We refer
to C(m,n) as the communication overhead, because we think of ai as a
message of length logm sent from the verifier to the prover. Note that
this allows the total communication from the prover to the verifier to ex-
ceed n logm, so proofs can be long (and highly interactive), but must be
produced online, i.e., before the stream has been seen completely, and the
communication cannot contain very long messages between two consecutive
symbols. In the annotation model (See Definition 3.1.1), only the prover
can send a message to the verifier.
In short, the goal of defining our model in such a manner is to make
the verifier extremely storage efficient and operate in an online fashion,
oﬄoading storage and computational load to the prover, while keeping the
results verifiable. In order to fully describe an algorithm in our model, one
also has to give instructions for the honest prover (since we are interested
in his computation overhead). We define the correctness of a computation
with regard to the soundness and completeness as in Definition 3.1.1. The
completeness error is the probability over the random choices of the verifier
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that a correct claim is rejected by the verifier. The soundness error is the
probability that an incorrect claim is accepted. The total error is the
maximum of the soundness and completeness errors.
6.3 Algorithms In Our New Model
In this section, we give algorithms for four different problems in our
new model which bounds the communication overhead instead of the total
communication. To begin, let us define these four different problems.
Definition 6.3.1. ( Median )
Given a stream σ = 〈a1, · · · , an〉 where ai ∈ [m], let pi : [n] → [n] be a
permutation that sorts the stream, i.e. pi is a function such that api(1) ≤
api(2) ≤ · · · ≤ api(n). If n is odd, the median is api(dn/2e). Otherwise, if





. The parity of n is
irrelevant from an algorithmic point of view1. For the purpose of this
thesis, we redefine the median of the stream σ to be api(dn/2e).
Definition 6.3.2. ( LIS )
Let σ = 〈a1, · · · , an〉 where ai ∈ [m]. A subsequence of σ of length k is
a sequence ai1 , ai2 , · · · , aik with i1 < i2 < · · · < ik. Such a subsequence
is said to be increasing if ai1 ≤ ai2 ≤ · · · ≤ · · · aik . LIS(σ) is the length
of the longest increasing subsequence, i.e., the largest k such that there is
a increasing subsequence of length k. We say the number y is a (1 − )-
approximation of LIS(x) if (1− ) · LIS(x) ≤ y ≤ LIS(x).
Definition 6.3.3. ( FULL RANK )
Let σ = 〈a1,1, a1,2, · · · , a1,n, a2,1, a2,2, · · · , a2,n, · · · , an,1, an,2, · · · , an,n〉 be a
1If n is even, we can execute two copies of the algorithm in parallel. The first
algorithm will evaluate the median of the stream 〈σ,m+ 1〉, while the second algorithm
will evaluate the median of the stream 〈σ, 0〉. The average of these two medians is the
actual median if n is even.
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stream of length n2, where ai,j ∈ [m]. Define the n× n matrix A such that
A(i, j) = ai,j for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Consider rank(A), the rank
of the matrix A over R. The FULL RANK problem is a decision problem
which outputs 1 if and only if rank(A) = n.
Definition 6.3.4. ( Perfect matching )
Let σ = 〈a1,1, a1,2, · · · , a1,n, a2,1, a2,2, · · · , a2,n, · · · , an,1, an,2, · · · , an,n〉 be a
stream of length n2, where ai,j ∈ {0, 1}. Define the n × n matrix A such
that A(i, j) = ai,j for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Let A be the adjacency
matrix of a graph G = (V,E). A matching M ⊆ E is a subset of the edges
such that no two edges share a common vertex. A perfect matching is a
matching such that exactly one edge of the matching is incident on each
vertex of the graph.
We give a summary of the protocols that we devised in our new model.
1. For the Median problem, our protocol has communication overhead
6+o(1), polylogarithmic time per symbol for both verifier and prover,
verifier’s space is O(log n+ log(1/)) with soundness error .
2. For the Longest Increasing Subsequence(LIS) problem, we computed
a (1−)-approximation using constant communication overhead, space
O(log2 n/), which succeeds with probability 1− 1/n.
3. For the FULL RANK problem, given a square matrix A which is
streamed row-wise, where |aij| ≤ n, there is a streaming algorithm
which can decide if A has full rank over the reals where the veri-
fier uses O(log n) storage and the total communication overhead is






4. For the perfect matching problem, given an adjacency matrix of the
graph G which is streamed row-wise, there is a streaming algorithm
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which can decide if G has a perfect matching where the verifier uses
O(log n) storage and the total communication overhead is constant






By relaxing the total communication restriction, we managed to find
an algorithm for the perfect matching problem which is not known to be
in NC (See Subsection 6.3.3.7 for details.). Our algorithm for the perfect
matching problem maintains the fully online nature of streaming.
Our protocols work in phases. The main idea is to partition the stream
in phases Pk of length n/2
k for k = 1, . . . , log n. During the first phase
P1, we observe the first n/2 elements of the stream, followed by the next
n/4 elements in phase P2 etc. During phase Pk+1, we “restream” the ele-
ments seen during phase Pk and some additional data which “measures” the
progress of the algorithm. Since we require that our communication over-
head remains a constant, the size of the additional data which is streamed




. We describe the measure of progress for
the Median and the FULL RANK protocol briefly.
For the Median protocol, the size of the set of candidates for the median
shrinks by a factor of two as the phases proceed. For the FULL RANK











if the matrix has full rank. The
measure of progress will be the dual space whose dimension is n
2k
and thus
gets smaller and smaller as the phases proceed.
6.3.1 Median
In this subsection, we show how to compute the median of n numbers
from a size n2 universe arriving on a data stream, with the help of a prover.
Recall that the median of a1, · · · , an is the element with rank n/2 in the
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sorted sequence2. Our algorithm also serves as an introduction to the main
ideas for all our algorithms: splitting the input into geometrically shrinking
phases, re-streaming parts of the data stream (usually during the next
phase), and using some measure of progress that allows us to restrict the
length of the re-streaming.
While the Median problem is in NC, and hence by Theorem 4.1.3,
there is a streaming algorithm in the Merlin-Arthur streaming model that
uses only polylog(n) space and communication, this general algorithm has
two drawbacks. First, there is an additional verification phase after the
stream has ended, including a O(log n) round conversation between the
prover and verifier after the stream has ended3. Secondly, during this
phase the prover has to perform a linear amount of computation, while
being mostly idle while reading the stream. The algorithm given in this
section increases the amount of communication between the prover and
verifier, but is substantially simpler than the algorithm of Theorem 4.1.3,
and has neither an additional verification phase nor a large computation
overhead for the prover. Moreover in our protocol, the verifier does not
need to “speak” to the prover. Only the prover communicates with the
verifier at different phases of the streaming process.
It is important to recall that the prover in our model is not clairvoyant,
i.e., does not know the median in advance. Otherwise he could simply
send the median to the verifier, who could store it, and then count all
the elements on the stream that are smaller. But for a moment, consider
a setting, in which the prover and verifier are allowed to see the whole
2Throughout the rest of the thesis, we ignore floor and ceiling operations.
3One has to use the Inner product protocol in [30] to obtain a O(log n) round protocol
in the Merlin-Arthur streaming model for Median as the generic protocol for NC will
need O(log2 n) rounds. Likewise, the reader can modify the logm round protocol that
we gave for the exact computation of F2 in Theorem 4.3.1 to obtain a O(log n) round
protocol for Median in the Merlin-Arthur streaming model.
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stream, and can exchange arbitrarily long messages after the end of the
stream (the definition of our model does not allow this, since this would
violate the communication overhead bound). In such a setting we can find
a very simple algorithm as well: the verifier computes a fingerprint of the
original stream while seeing the stream. The prover computes the median
during the original stream, and then, after the stream has ended sends the
median x to the verifier, and furthermore re-streams the whole original
stream. The verifier can now operate as if in the clairvoyant model, and
check if x is indeed the median of the re-streamed numbers. Furthermore
the verifier must test whether the prover faithfully re-streams, using his
fingerprint.
In our median algorithm we try to emulate this approach, by “folding”
the re-streaming of parts of the data stream into the original stream while
maintaining small communication overhead. Since the prover does not
know the median after, say 3n/4 steps, he has to provide some partial
information to the verifier.
Our algorithm is based on the following observation. Consider a stream
of n numbers an, · · · , a1 with 0 ≤ ai ≤ n2 for concreteness (for convenience
an arrives first). After n/2 numbers have appeared on the stream, each of
them could still be the median (due to n/2 numbers still appearing in the
future). However, after we have seen n(1 − 1/2k) numbers, at most n/2k
of the numbers already seen are still candidates for becoming the median:
all others either have rank smaller than n/2 − n/2k or larger than n/2 in
the sorted sequence and are no longer candidates for being the median, no
matter what the rest of the stream will look like.
The main idea now is to partition the stream in phases of length n/2k
for k = 1, . . . , log n. Phase k + 1 is used to simulate the re-streaming
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idea described above. But note that during this phase we can only re-
stream O(n/2k) elements, and not the whole previous stream. It is now
very convenient since there are only n/2k candidates left that are worth re-
streaming. But this is not enough, because the verifier can only establish
correctness of the re-streaming with his fingerprint if the whole stream he
has computed the fingerprint from is repeated, not some selection from it.
We now describe the algorithm in detail. Denote by Pk the k-th phase
of the algorithm, as well as the numbers appearing on the stream in the
k-th phase, i.e., an/2k−1 , · · · , an/2k+1. In the following, let F˜P () denote
the multiset fingerprint of a stream of length at most n with reliability
1− 
2 logn−1 . According to Lemma 3.1.3, such a fingerprint can be computed
online with space O(log n− log ).
• In P1, the verifier computes the fingerprint F1 = F˜P (P1) of the first
n/2 numbers, i.e. an, · · · , an/2+1. The prover sorts the numbers. Let
C1 denote the sequence of the first n/2 numbers in the sorted stream.
• In P2, the verifier computes the fingerprint F2 = F˜P (P2) of the next
n/4 numbers, i.e. an/2, · · · , an/4+1. The prover keeps sorting, and
determines C2, the sequence of numbers with ranks between n/4 and
n/2 (relative to P1 ◦ P2 := an, · · · , an/4+1), in their sorted ordering.
Let y2 denote the minimum of C2 and z2 the maximum of C2.
• In Pk for k > 2, the following happens. Let Ck denote the sequence
of numbers with rank n/2 − n/2k up to n/2 in P1 ◦ · · · ◦ Pk :=
an, · · · , an/2k+1 in their sorted ordering. At the beginning of Pk, the
verifier knows Fk−1 (the fingerprint of Pk−1) and also the fingerprint
of Ck−2. The prover knows Ck−1.
1. The (honest) prover sends the elements yk−1 and zk−1 of Ck−1
98
that have rank n/2−n/2k−1 and rank n/2 (relative to P1 ◦ · · · ◦
Pk−1 := an, · · · , an/2k−1+1).
2. The prover re-streams Ck−2 and Pk−1. The verifier checks the
re-streaming of Ck−2 and Pk−1 against his fingerprints, and com-
putes the fingerprints of the sequence Ck−1 as well as of the se-
quence Pk. Note that Ck−1 is easy to determine from Ck−2, Pk−1,
yk−1, zk−1. Indeed to determine Ck−1, the prover first divides the
stream seen during Pk−1 into three parts. Let P 1k−1 denote all
the elements of Pk−1 that are less than or equal to yk−2, P 2k−1
be all the elements of Pk−1 that are between yk−2 and zk−2 and
lastly, P 3k−1 denote all the elements of Pk−1 that are greater than
or equal to zk−2. The prover will send P 1k−1, then P
2
k−1 ◦Ck−2 in
their sorted order (indicating whether the element is from P 2k−1
or Ck−2) and finally P 3k−1 to the verifier. It is easy to see that
such a procedure enables the verifier to check the correctness of
yk−1 and zk−1 and also to compute the fingerprint of Ck−1.
3. Note that |Ck−2| = 4n/2k + 1 for k ≥ 4, |Pk−1| = 2n/2k and
|Pk| = n/2k. As a result, the communication overhead is 6+o(1).
4. At the end of Pk, the prover determines the set Ck which consists
of all elements that have rank between n/2− n/2k and n/2.
• When n/2k = O(1), then the verifier stores Ck−1, instead of finger-
printing it. He then stops talking to the prover, and instead sorts the
remaining sequence himself (note that elements smaller than yk−1
or larger than zk−1 can be ignored). The verifier can determine the
median at the end of the stream.
Theorem 6.3.5. The Median problem can be solved with communication
overhead 6 + o(1), polylogarithmic time per symbol for both verifier and
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prover and the verifier’s space is O(log n + log(1/)). The error of the
protocol is .
Proof. The communication overhead was shown to be 6 above, with the
o(1) accounting for the communication of the yk and zk. It is clear that
this algorithm can be implemented using polylog time per symbol for both
the verifier and the prover. The verifier at any given time needs to store at
most two fingerprints, and a constant number of elements from the stream.
Each fingerprint needs O(log n− log ) bits of storage.
If the prover tries to cheat, he will succeed if any one of the fingerprint
of P1, · · · , Plogn or C1, · · · , Clogn−1 fails. Since the reliability of each of
the fingerprint is 1− 
2 logn−1 and there are at most 2 log n− 1 fingerprints
computed by the verifier, by the union bound, the error of the protocol is
.
6.3.2 Longest Increasing Subsequence
In this subsection, we give an algorithm structurally similar to the al-
gorithm from Subsection 6.3.1 to compute the Longest Increasing Subse-
quence (LIS) of a data stream with the help of a prover. Given a se-
quence/stream x1, · · · , xn of elements from {1, · · · , n2} (n2 again chosen
for concreteness), the length of the longest increasing subsequence LIS(x)
is the largest k such there exist i1 < · · · < ik with xij ≤ xij+1 for all
1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1.
LIS is a natural and well-studied problem, for more information re-
garding this problem, the reader is referred to the survey by Aldous and
Diaconis [5]. It is well known that LIS is in the complexity class NC (e.g
See [108]). LIS is also related to the distance to monotonicity problem
(under the edit distance), see [34, 54]. There is a classical algorithm that
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computes LIS(x), called Patience Sort [5].
The Patience Sort algorithm naturally works in the streaming model,
but requires O(k log n) bits of storage to compute k = LIS(x) exactly,
which is not efficient enough (e.g., in the worst case, k = O(n). Even for
inputs in which each permutation is equally likely, the expected length of
the longest increasing subsequence is approximately 2
√
n [5]).
Gopalan, Jayram, Krauthgamer and Kumar [54] described a determin-





compute a (1−)-approximation of LIS(x). They also showed that any ran-
domized algorithm that computes LIS(x) exactly in the streaming model
requires linear space in the worst case. Gal and Gopalan [44] as well as





the space needed to deterministically compute a (1 − )-approximation of
LIS(x). Finally, Chakrabarti [19] argues that extending these lower bounds
to the randomized case needs different techniques, so the best randomized
lower bounds are still only logarithmic. For the randomized case, we note
that it is wide open whether one can construct a streaming algorithm which
uses space o (
√
n) to compute a (1 − )-approximation of LIS(x) for con-
stant  ∈ (0, 1).
We will show how to compute a (1− )-approximation of LIS(x) using
polylog(n) verifier space in the presence of a prover in our model, i.e., with
small communication overhead but large total communication.
6.3.2.1 Patience Sort
Patience Sort works as follows. The algorithm maintains an ordered set
of sets (which we will call stacks) of elements. Stacks are named from 1 up
to some number k, and should be imagined as being arranged from left to
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right. In the beginning, we start with an empty set of stacks. As a new
input xi arrives, we find the leftmost stack such that the top (minimum)
element of that stack is strictly larger than xi, and put xi on top of that
stack. If no such stack exists, we start a new stack to the right of the
existing stacks, and put xi on top of that stack. We refer to [5] for the many
interesting properties of this algorithm. Notice that the original version of
Patience Sort only needs to maintain the top elements of all stacks used.
We will refer to the number of the stack as arranged from left to right as
the name of the stack. This is important, because in our algorithm we will
not maintain all stacks but only a small subset of them, but we will keep
their names intact.
It is easy to see that in the end the largest name of a stack (the right-
most stack) corresponds to LIS(x). Further observations include that the
sequence of elements on the tops of the stacks (the sequence of stack min-
ima) is increasing, but not necessarily an increasing subsequence. Each
stack viewed from the bottom to the top is a strictly decreasing sequence
(and indeed a subsequence of x).
Like our algorithm for computing the median, our algorithm for LIS
works in log n phases, in which the prover re-streams part of the original
stream, but in this case under various permutations. The main ingredi-
ent here is the following dual characterization of LIS(x) in the spirit of
Dilworth’s theorem [64].
Definition 6.3.6. A descending chain is a subsequence xi1 > · · · > xil ,
where 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < il ≤ n. For convenience we set x0 = m+1 and i0 = 0,
where m is the size of the universe.
The extension of a descending chain is a sequence y1, . . . , yn such that
yk = xij , where ij is the largest index from {i0, · · · , il} which is at most k.
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Two descending chains xi1 > · · · > xil and xj1 > · · · > xjm cross, if for
their extensions y and z, there are indices u < v such that yu < zu and
yv > zv or vice versa.
Example 6.3.7. ( Descending chains that do not cross )
Let σ = (7, 2, 8, 1, 6, 5). Here n = 6 and m = 8. Let σ1 = (7, 2, 1)
and σ2 = (8, 6, 5) be two descending chains of σ. The extension of σ1 is
(7, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1) while the extension of σ2 is (9, 9, 8, 8, 6, 5). From Figure 6.3.1,
it is easy to see that the two descending chains σ1 and σ2 do not cross.
Figure 6.3.1: Descending chains that do not cross.
Example 6.3.8. ( Descending chains that cross )
Let σ = (7, 2, 8, 1, 6, 5). Here n = 6 and m = 8. Let σ3 = (7, 6, 5)
and σ4 = (2, 1) be two descending chains of σ. The extension of σ3 is
(7, 7, 7, 7, 6, 5) while the extension of σ4 is (9, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1). From Figure 6.3.2,
it is easy to see that the two descending chains σ3 and σ4 cross.
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Figure 6.3.2: Descending chains that cross.
Lemma 6.3.9. LIS(x) = k if and only if there is a partition of x =
x1, . . . , xn into k descending chains, such that no two of the chains cross
and that the chains can be ordered so that the smallest elements of the
chains form an increasing sequence.
Proof. If LIS(x) = k, then Patience Sort will find a partition into ex-
actly k descending chains (corresponding to the stacks maintained by the
algorithm) whose smallest elements form an increasing sequence. These
descending chains do not cross by construction: if two descending chains
cross, then this means that an element that can fit on top of the left stack
is placed on the stack further to the right at some point, which violates the
algorithm.
Conversely, assume the minimum size of a partition with the above
properties is k. The chains in the partitions are numbered 1 to k and we
refer to lower numbered chains as being to the left of higher numbered
chains.
First we observe that if we remove elements xl, . . . , xn from the chains,
the property that the smallest elements of the chains form an increasing
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sequence remains true. To see this, consider removing one element xn.
xn must be the smallest element of some chain, because chains are subse-
quences. We remove the rightmost appearance of xn if there are several
elements equal to xn which are smallest elements of chains. Clearly re-
moving an element like this cannot make chains cross. Now suppose that
the smallest elements of the resulting chains no longer form an increasing
sequence. That means the smallest element of the chain to the right of the
chain where we removed xn is some xj and xn < xj < xi where xi is the
new smallest element of the chain where we removed xn. Let y denote the
extension of the chain containing xn and z the extension of the other chain.
Assume that j < i < n. In this case yj ≥ yi = xi > xj = zj. So assume
that i < j < n. Then yj = yi = xi > xj = zj. In both cases we have that
zn = zj = xj > xn = yn, so the chains cross, a contradiction.
We conclude that if we remove elements xl, . . . , xn from the chains,
the smallest elements of the chains, left to right, still form an increasing
sequence.
We have to show that LIS(x) = k. To show ≤, we simply observe that
any partition into k descending chains is a witness for LIS(x) ≤ k. For
the other direction, take any partition into descending chains that do not
cross and have increasing smallest elements. We construct an increasing
subsequence of length k. Take the largest element of the rightmost chain,
which is going to be the first (bottom) element of the chain. When this
is xj, we remove all elements xj, . . . , xn. By the above argument we are
left with k − 1 chains that still have the desired properties. By induction
we get an increasing subsequence of length k − 1 that ends in the smallest
element xi of the rightmost chain (among x1, . . . , xj−1). xi ≤ xj, because
among x1, . . . , xj the element xj is the smallest element of the rightmost
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chain. So we can find an increasing sequence of length k.
The partition of x into k descending chains can easily be computed by
modifying Patience Sort, so that it keeps all the elements of the stacks,
instead of only the top elements. Note that this increases the space usage,
but this work will be done by the prover.
6.3.2.2 Intuition for the Algorithm
The idea of our protocol is that the (honest) prover runs Patience Sort,
and convinces the verifier via re-streaming of certain permutations of sub-
streams that he did so correctly. Let us consider a scenario, where this
verification is allowed to take place after the original input stream has ended
(this is not allowed in our model and considered here only for motivation).
While the prover executes the Patience Sort algorithm during the original
stream, he announces the stack number of each new element to the verifier.
The verifier computes the multiset fingerprint of the set of tuples i, xi, li,
where li is the announced stack number of element xi arriving at time i.
After the original stream has ended, the prover re-streams this set in two
different ways, making it possible for the verifier to check that Patience
Sort was executed correctly.
The first re-streaming consists of all the i, xi, li ordered by the stack
numbers and then (inside every stack) by the sequence number i, i.e., the
verifier gets to see the sequence as partitioned into the descending chains. If
any chain is not descending, he will reject the computation. The multiset
fingerprint will allow him to check the re-streaming for correctness even
though it is not in the original order. The verifier also tests that the
minimum elements of all chains form an increasing sequence. For this, he
just needs to remember the smallest element of the current chain.
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With the second re-streaming we want to check that none of the chains
cross. If two chains cross, then two neighboring chains cross. So for all
neighboring pairs of chains, we need to check that they do not cross.
Definition 6.3.10. An alignment of two chains xi1 , . . . , xil and xj1 , . . . , xjk
is the sequence of all the elements of the two chains, sorted by their position
in x, and accompanied by bits indicating whether elements belong to the
first or the second sequence.
The prover will re-stream the alignments of all pairs of neighboring
chains. The verifier can now easily check that those pairs do not cross:
crossing means that an element is added to the right chain even if it would
fit into the left chain. The verifier can also easily construct the fingerprint
of the set of i, xi, li for their first and second appearance in the re-streaming
(all chains except the first and the last are re-streamed twice). These fin-
gerprints can be checked against the multiset fingerprint the verifier knows.
In this way, two re-streams would allow us to check the correctness of
the Patience Sort execution, and allow for an exact computation of LIS(x).
6.3.2.3 The Algorithm
As in the algorithm for Median in Subsection 6.3.1, we partition [n] into
log n subsets of decreasing size, called the phases of the algorithm. Each
phase is handled similarly to the above description (with the re-streaming
taking place during the next phase). The main issue is how to connect the
phases to check overall correctness. The first idea is to keep a fingerprint of
the top of all stacks, i.e., the sequence visible to the sequential Patience Sort
algorithm at all times. This allows to connect two phases, since all we need
is to make sure that the tops of stacks are consistent across phases. How-
ever, the prover has to re-stream the k top elements to check consistency
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(the verifier does not have enough memory to store them), and usually at
some time the phases become too short to do that (e.g. if LIS(x) =
√
n
and the phase length gets to o (
√
n)). Note that we could simply stop at
that point, since we have already achieved some approximation. But in
order to get a (1 − )-approximation, one would have to stop when the
current estimate for LIS(x) is at least 1/ times the current phase length.
This would mean that the re-streaming used until now requires the com-
munication overhead to be at least 1/, which is not desirable. Instead we
reduce the number of stacks to O(log n/) and continue, still achieving a
good approximation, but leaving the communication overhead independent
of . Intuitively we keep stacks whose name is a multiple of k/ log n if k
is the current largest stack name. This gives us an approximation error of
, since the reduction in the number of stacks happens only at the end of
a phase, and there are only log n phases. The error analysis is completely
analogous to the one given in [54].
Denote by P` the `-th phase, i.e., xn−n/2`−1+1, . . . , xn−n/2` . We now
describe the algorithm in our usual model, i.e., without extra time for re-
streaming at the end.
The algorithm keeps a variable k that contains the largest stack name
used so far. It starts as k = 0. In phase P1, the prover runs the Patience
Sort algorithm, announcing for each element xi, the number si of the stack
he is putting the element on to the verifier. The verifier computes the
multiset fingerprint of all the tuples i, xi, si. We are using fingerprints with
reliability 1−1/n2. The verifier increases k by one if necessary, and rejects,
if the prover tries to increase k by more than 1.
In each phase P` for ` = 2, . . . , log n until n/2
` < k, the following
happens. As before the prover will continue to run Patience Sort, and
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communicate the stack numbers, and the verifier will create a (new) mul-
tiset fingerprint for the tuples i, xi, si with i ∈ P`. But furthermore the
prover will use this phase to re-stream the permuted inputs from the pre-
vious phase. For ` ≥ 2, he re-streams the tuples i, xi, si for i ∈ P`−1 sorted
by the third component (and for each value of the third component sorted
by the first component). The verifier again takes the multiset fingerprint
of this sequence, and eventually checks it against the one computed in the
previous phase. If the fingerprints do not agree, he rejects and stops. Fur-
thermore the verifier checks during this re-streaming that all stacks are
indeed strictly decreasing sequences and that the minimal elements of all
the stacks form an increasing sequence (if not he will reject). The verifier
also computes the vector fingerprint of these minimal elements, which is
used to connect two neighboring phases.
As described above, a second re-streaming of the elements from phase
`−1 is needed to check that neighboring stacks do not cross. So, the prover
re-streams for all pairs of stacks their alignment (as defined above). If the
two stacks cross, the verifier rejects. To check consistency the verifier again
computes the multiset fingerprints of the first and second occurrences of
each of the stacks and checks these fingerprints against the one from P`−1.
Finally, the verifier takes the vector fingerprints of the two occurrences of
a stack in the re-streaming (except for the first and last stack) and checks
that they are the same. This finishes the phase.
For ` > 2, we need to make sure that the re-streaming for consecutive
phases fit together. Furthermore we do not want to re-stream the whole
stacks, because we need the length of the re-streaming in a phase to be
within a constant factor of the length of the phase. Note that the only
relevant point here is that top (minimal elements) of all stacks at the end
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of one phase coincides with the top of all stacks at the beginning of the next
phase. Indeed the prover and verifier agree to discard all elements except
the top of all stacks and re-streaming will only consider the elements that
appeared in the previous phase.
Hence we modify the computations during a phase P` for ` ≥ 3 as
follows. From phase P`−1, we hold a vector fingerprint of the sequence
of minimal elements of all the stacks at the end of P`−2. Assume this
sequence is xi1 ≤ · · · ≤ xik . Then the re-streaming of phase P` concerns
running Patience Sort on the sequence xi1 , . . . , xik followed by the inputs
from phase P`−1. These are k + n/2`−1 elements. The verifier can now
check that the first k elements are correct, and can compute the multiset
fingerprint of the re-streaming of P`−1, as well as check the correct execution
of Patience Sort.
Once we reach the point where n/2` < k, we cannot continue the above
because the re-streaming of the top of the stacks is no longer possible with a
small communication overhead. At this point we switch to approximation,
similar to the deterministic streaming approximation algorithm from [54].
Say we have m stacks currently in use by the Patience Sort algorithm which
is executed by the prover. These have top elements xi1 , . . . , xim (i.e., the
decreasing chains in the stacks end in those elements). We now choose
log n/ stacks from 1 up to m (evenly spaced) and discard the remaining
stacks. This operation is referred to as cleanup. Note that stacks do not
change their names during cleanup and that we will never remove the stack
with the largest name (which is k).
Assume the set of stack names is S = {j1, . . . , jm} and that m >
2 log n/ and that k = jm is the largest stack number. The prover then sets
S to {d/ log n · ke, d2/ log n · ke, . . . , k} , discarding the remaining stacks.
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The first time this happens S starts as {1, . . . , k}, and the prover has to
re-stream the sequence of top elements of all the stacks so that the veri-
fier can compute the new sequence of top elements of the reduced set of
stacks (and its fingerprint). This is still possible within constant overhead.
The same needs to be done after any cleanup operation, but note that the
number of stacks in phase ` can now never exceed O
(
2 log n/+ n/2`
)
.
We claim that the cleanup operations each introduce error at most
/ log n. Also note, that this reduction step takes place every time n/2`
exceeds the current k by a constant factor, because k may start to grow
again after a cleanup, but that this happens at most once per phase. There
are log n phases and hence at most that many cleanup operations and the
total error is bounded by .
Lemma 6.3.11. The total error introduced by all the cleaning up steps is
at most .
Proof. Each reduction step removes some of the stacks maintained by the
Patience Sort algorithm. Consider sequences of some length l that ends in
an element a from the universe U = {1, . . . , n2}. We denote by P (l) the
smallest element a of U such that there is an increasing subsequence of
length l that ends in a. Note that Patience Sort computes P (l) as the top
(smallest) element of stack l.
For simplicity assume that a cleanup operation happens at the end of
every phase. If the first few phases do not include a cleanup, then the error
can only decrease. Denote by k` the maximum stack name after phase P`.
We define P ′(l) to be P (l) if stack l is in S, i.e., has not been discarded,
and otherwise P ′(l) = P (j) for the smallest j such that j > l and j ∈ S.
Naturally, P ′(l) ≥ P (l). Furthermore denote by Pt(l) the smallest element
a such that there is an increasing subsequence of length l that ends in a
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among x1, . . . , xt. In a similar manner, define P
′
t(l) to be Pt(l) if stack l is
in S, and otherwise P ′t(l) = Pt(j) for the smallest j such that j > l and
j ∈ S.
We will use the following claim, which basically states that at any time
t ≤ log n, a slightly shorter sequence ending in a or a lesser element still
exists. This claim is proved exactly like Lemma 2.2 in [54].
Claim 6.3.12.
P ′t(l − (t− 1)kt/ log n) ≤ Pt(l).
Note that there are at most log n phases and so in the end P ′((l−)k) ≤
P (l), where k is the final maximum name of any stack. This directly shows
that in the end the error is at most .
Finally, at some point P` < 10 log n/. At this point the prover still
sends the sequence of top elements from all stacks, but then prover and
verifier stop communicating. The prover starts with the given sequence
(which fits into his memory) and runs Patience Sort himself with the re-
maining input.
We can now state the overall result of this section.
Theorem 6.3.13. There is a streaming algorithm with a prover for com-
puting a (1 − )-approximation of LIS(x) using constant communication
overhead (independent of n and ), space O(log2 n/), and success proba-
bility 1− 1/n. The computation overhead of the prover is polylog n.
We note that the only source of error is a failure of fingerprinting,




In this subsection, we consider the problem of determining whether an
n×n integer matrix containing integers of size n (for concreteness) has full
rank over the reals (the matrix is streamed row by row, each entry being
one symbol on the stream).
Clarkson and Woodruff [24] studied the rank decision problem in the
standard streaming model for turnstile updates. They showed that any
streaming algorithm which succeeds with constant probability needs Ω(k2)
bits of space to determine if the rank of A ∈ Mn(Z) is at least k. They





bits of space needed for the failure
probability to be at most δ. It follows from a reduction we describe in
Section 6.4 that Ω(n2) bits of space are needed to determine if A ∈Mn(Z)
is full rank in the time-series model.
We study the problem in our model. One issue we run into imme-
diately is that standard factorizations of matrices that reveal the rank
(e.g., the Gauss-Jordan elimination) require exponential size numbers as
entries of the factor matrices. Given B ∈ Mm,n(Z), let ||B||∞ to be the
maximum absolute value of any entry of B. Fang and Havas [36] showed
that the Gauss-Jordan elimination over Z has worst-case exponential space
complexity, i.e. the entries of the factor matrices can be bounded exponen-
tially in ||A||∞, where the Gauss-Jordan elimination is performed over Z on
A ∈Mm,n(Z). This phenomenon is known as “entry explosion”. Havas et
al. [57] claim that in practice, “entry explosion” often occurs when Gauss-
Jordan elimination is performed over Z.
That means even if an honest prover tries to convince us by means
of such a factorization, he cannot even tell us what the entries are in an
efficient manner! However, probabilistic techniques come to our rescue,
113
and it is possible to simply choose a large enough prime p, and test if the
matrix has full rank over the field Fp. On the other hand one has to be
careful with standard concepts like orthogonality over a finite field, as we
shall see below.
6.3.3.1 Verifying Matrix Multiplication in the Streaming Model
Suppose we are given A ∈Mm,n(Fp) and we wish to verify if A = BC,
where B ∈ Mm(Fp) and C ∈ Mm,n(Fp), with m ≤ n and n2 ≤ p ≤ 2n2 is
a prime. In the streaming model, we cannot store any of these matrices and
compute the matrix multiplication and do the equality test. Even if the
entries of B and C were streamed for us to verify the matrix multiplication,
we would need to stream each row of B n times and each column of C n
times.
Freivalds [42] introduced a simple randomized algorithm to verify ma-
trix multiplication using O(n2) multiplications and addition, using n bits of
randomness. But the verifier cannot store this n bits of randomness. Kim-
brel and Sinha [68] improved Freivalds’ algorithm so that we only need to
use O(log n) random bits. Algorithm 6.3.1 illustrates how to verify A = BC
in the streaming model, where we are only allowed to stream A,B and C
once and the verifier’s space is O(log n).
1. Choose r∗ ∈ Fp and s∗ ∈ Fp uniformly at random. Let
r = (1, r1∗, r
2
∗, · · · , rn−1∗ )T ∈ Fnp and
s = (1, s1∗, s
2
∗, · · · , sm−1∗ ) ∈ Fmp .
2. Compute sAr and sBCr. Accept if and only if these two
quantities are the same.
Algorithm 6.3.1: Verifying A = BC in the Streaming Model.
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Algorithm 6.3.1 uses O(log n) random bits. It is known that over any
integral domain, every Vandermonde matrix of n distinct nonzero elements
is nonsingular (See [78] for details). If A 6= BC, then there are only n− 1
vectors r (out of O(n2) vectors) such that Ar = BCr. Note that s(Ar)
and s(BCr) are the vector fingerprints of Ar and BCr respectively. The
algorithm can only err when A 6= BC and either Ar = BCr or Ar 6= BCr






i−1ri−1Aij, the verifier can compute this quan-
tity using O(log n) space if the prover re-streams matrix A once. Using the
vector fingerprint4 given in Lemma 3.1.4, the verifier can check if the ma-
trix A which appeared on the stream before is the same as the one the
prover is providing. If we let x = Cr and yT = sB, then the inner prod-







j−1Ckj, the verifier can compute (sB)(Cr) if the prover streams
the k-th column of B followed by the k-th row of C for all k = 1, · · · ,m.
6.3.3.2 Hermite Normal Form of an Integer Matrix
Given an integer matrix, we would like to obtain a canonical repre-
sentation of the matrix so that we can calculate important properties of
the matrix, like its rank and determinant easily. One standard technique
in linear algebra is to transform the matrix into row echelon form using
Gaussian elimination. But this involves divisions over Z, and the resulting
reduced row echelon matrix need not be an integer matrix. As such, we
consider the Hermite normal form of a matrix.
Definition 6.3.14. Let A ∈Mm,n(Z) with r nonzero rows. A is said to be
in row Hermite normal form (HNF) if the following conditions are satisfied:
4We view an m× n matrix as a vector of dimension mn.
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1. The first r rows of A are nonzero.
2. For 1 ≤ i ≤ r, let Ai,ji be the first nonzero entry in the i-th row of
A. Then j1 < j2 < · · · < jr.
3. Ai,ji > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
4. If 1 ≤ k < i ≤ r, then 0 ≤ Ak,ji < Ai,ji .
The entries Ai,ji will be called the corner entries of A. Every integer
matrix can be reduced to its Hermite normal form via row operations.
See [98] for details. More precisely, we have the following.
Lemma 6.3.15. Let A ∈ Mm,n(Z). Then there exists an unique matrix
H ∈ Mm,n(Z) which is in row Hermite normal form and U ∈ GLm(Z)
such that A = UH.
The matrix factorization in Lemma 6.3.15 is rank revealing. But the
entries in H and U can be exponential in the size of the entries of A. For
details of “entry explosion” in the computation of Hermite normal form,
the reader is referred to [31] and the references therein. In our model, we
may not be able to communicate the entries of H and U . Thus we consider
reducing the matrix modulo d to its Hermite normal form.
For any integer matrix A, we let A¯ be the result of reducing all its
entries modulo d.
Definition 6.3.16. A is said to be in row Hermite normal form modulo d
if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. A = A¯.
2. A is in row Hermite normal form over Z.
3. The corner entries of A divide d.
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Similar to Lemma 6.3.15, given any A ∈Mm,n(Z), there exist an unique
matrix H ∈Mm,n(Zd) which is in row Hermite normal form modulo d and
U ∈ GLm(Zd) such that A = UH (mod d). The number of nonzero rows
of H is called the d-rank of A.
For A ∈ Mm,n(Fp) where m ≤ n, by considering the Hermite normal





where rank(A) = r over Fp, U ∈ GLm(Fp), G ∈ Mr,n(Fp) is in row
Hermite normal form modulo p and O is the all zero matrix of size m− r
by n. We define CA to be the row space of A. Since A and ( G O )T




y ∈ Fnp | 〈x, y〉 = 0 ∀ x ∈ CA
}
has dimension n − r. We describe how to obtain a basis of C⊥A efficiently
from the HNF factorization of A given in (6.1). Since the corner entries
of G divide p, all of them are 1. As such, there exists a permutation






Since the rank of B can be at most n− r and the last n− r rows of B are
linearly independent, it follows that the rank of B is n − r. Observe that
GPB = 0. Let C := PB which is full rank5. Every row of G is orthogonal
5A matrix A ∈Mm,n(F) is said to be full rank if rank(A) = min(m,n).
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to each of the columns of C. As such, the columns of C forms a basis
for C⊥A . In the literature of coding theory [104], G and CT are called the
generator and parity check matrix of the code CA respectively.
In view of this, we can first permute the columns of A and then consider
its HNF factorization.
Definition 6.3.17. Let A ∈ Mm,n(Fp) where m ≤ n and rank(A) = r






where D ∈ Mr,(n−r)(Fp). We call this the HNF factorization of A in
standard form.
6.3.3.3 The Result
Given a square matrix A ∈ Mn(Z) which is streamed row-wise, where
|aij| ≤ n, we wish to determine if A has full rank over the reals. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that A has no zero rows. In Section 6.4, we
show a reduction from Index which implies that this problem is hard for
streaming algorithms in the standard streaming model, i.e., such algorithms
would need space Ω(n2). The problem is in NC, so by Theorem 4.1.3
there is an efficient streaming algorithm with a prover, but our algorithm
is much simpler and not based on arithmetization techniques and does
not have an extra verification phase after the end of the stream. Our
algorithm does not have polylogarithmic time overhead for the prover, but
finding an algorithm with that much efficiency would imply a quasilinear
time algorithm for the problem, which is a major open problem. The
best randomized algorithm that we know currently to compute the rank
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of a matrix A over a field requires O˜ (|A|+ rω) field operations [23], where
r = rank(A), |A| denotes the number of nonzero entries of A and ω < 2.373
is the matrix multiplication exponent [27, 79, 105]. We remind the reader
that the matrix multiplication exponent ω is defined as the minimum value
such that two n× n matrices over a field can be multiplied using O (nω+)
arithmetic operations for any  > 0.
However, for the FULL RANK protocol in our model, the time spent
by the prover is well spread out over the duration of the stream, and his
work consists mostly of computing various matrix factorizations. We state
the main theorem first before describing the protocol.
Theorem 6.3.18. Given a square matrix A ∈ Mn(Z) which is streamed
row-wise, where |aij| ≤ n, there is a streaming algorithm with a prover
which can decide if A has full rank over the reals where the verifier uses
O(log n) storage and the total communication overhead is constant with






Our general approach is to compute the rank over a random prime p
instead of over the reals, in order to avoid blowing up the size of matrix
entries, an often encountered problem with computing e.g. the QR factor-
ization.
The following argument shows that if we choose a random prime p from
a set of primes whose size is polynomial in n, the p-rank of A will be the
same as the rank of A over the reals with high probability.
Let B be any r × r square submatrix of A. By the Hadamard bound
for determinant [59], we have | det(B)| ≤ (√r n)r. Hence, the number of
distinct prime factors for det(B) is at most r(log r+ log n) ≤ 2n log n. Let
b = 2s ln s, where s = 2n2 log n. It is known that pi(n) > n/ lnn for n ≥ 17,
where pi(n) is the prime counting function. Since pi(b) > s, if we choose a
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prime p randomly between [1, b],






If the rank of A is k, there exist A˜, a k × k submatrix of A with nonzero
determinant, and all (k+1)×(k+1) submatrices ofA have zero determinant.
If we choose p randomly between [1, b], the probability that det(A˜) 6≡ 0
(mod p) is at least 1− 1/n and all (k+ 1)× (k+ 1) submatrices of A have
zero determinant. As a result, with probability at least 1−1/n, the p-rank
of A is exactly k.
We introduce some notations first which will help us analyze the pro-
tocol. We let ai to be the i-th row of A, A
(i) := span{a1, · · · , ai} and
W (i) := (A(i))⊥.
6.3.3.4 Protocol
The verifier and prover choose a prime p randomly between [1, b] before
seeing the stream, where b = O˜(n2). We will assume that the p-rank of
A is equal to the rank of A over the reals. Before the entries are being
streamed, the verifier chooses a prime n3 < q < 2n3 and then chooses r
uniformly at random from Fq (and keeps it private from P). In phase 1, the
verifier computes FPq(r, A1), the fingerprint of A1, which is a submatrix of
A consisting of the first n/2 rows of A.
For phase 2, it starts when an/2+1,1 is streamed and ends when a3n/4,n
is streamed. In this phase, the verifier computes the fingerprint of A2,
which is a submatrix of A consisting of the next n/4 rows. In this phase,








which is the HNF factorization of A1 in standard form. For the matrix in
standard HNF, P should only stream the entries of H1 and for each row of
P1, the prover should stream j such that pi,j = 1. V should compute the
fingerprints of U1, H1 and P1 as they are streamed during the verification of
the matrix multiplication. P should also convince V that U1 is invertible by
verifying the matrix multiplication U1U
−1
1 = I. To check if P1 is indeed a
permutation matrix, suppose that the prover claims that S := {j1, · · · , jn}
satisfies pi,ji = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. V needs to check if S = [n], which can
be checked by using the multiset fingerprint in Lemma 3.1.3. P and V




column space of W1 is W
(n/2). The verifier will also have to compute the
fingerprint of W1. They proceed to phase 3 if all fingerprints agree and the
verifier accepts all the matrix multiplication verifications if A1 is full rank.
If A1 is not full rank, P and V will verify the matrix multiplication
xA1 = 0, where 0 6= x ∈ Fn/2p . In this case, the protocol terminates and V
accepts only if the matrix multiplication verification passes.
Also during phase 2, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n/4, P determines if an/2+i ∈
A(n/2+i−1). If there exists an index 1 ≤ i ≤ n/4 such that an/2+i ∈
A(n/2+i−1), P will inform V to stop. In this case, there exists d ∈ Fi−1p
such that x := an/2+i +
∑i−1
j=1 dj an/2+j ∈ A(n/2). In this case, P and V will
verify the matrix multiplication
(










V will keep the fingerprint of x as they verify 6.3. Now, they will verify
xW1 = 0 and the protocol will terminate with V convinced that A is not
full rank.
Otherwise, we have an/2+i 6∈ A(n/2+i−1) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n/4. Then for
each such i, there exists a zi ∈ W (n/2+i−1) such that 〈an/2+i, zi〉 6= 0. The
prover computes all such zi for i = 1, · · · , n/4.
Phase 3 starts when a3n/4+1,1 is streamed and ends when a7n/8,n is
streamed. V will compute the fingerprint of A3, which is a submatrix
of A consisting of the next n/8 rows. In this phase, P will convince V that
the first 3n/4 rows of A are linearly independent by verifying the following
matrix multiplications:
(i) A2 [ z1 · · · zn/4 ] = L2 for some L2 ∈ GLn/4(Fp) which is lower
triangular.
(ii) W1C1 = [ z1 · · · zn/4 ] for some C1 ∈Mn/2,n/4(Fp).
(iii) A2W2 = 0, where W2 ∈Mn,n/4(Z) whose column space is
W (3n/4). P should provide W2 in HNF so that V can easily
check that W2 is full rank.
(iv) W1C2 = W2 for some C2 ∈Mn/2,n/4(Fp).
Subroutine 6.3.2: To verify if the first 3n/4 rows of A are linearly
independent and the correctness of the dual space of A(3n/4).
All the four steps can be done in parallel with V keeping the fingerprints
of [ z1 · · · zn/4 ] and W2 to ensure that the right matrices are streamed in the
different messages. They proceed as such in O(log n) phases to determine
if A is full rank. Note that for the last phase of the matrix rank protocol, if
we would continue just like before, we would have to stream back a vector
of length n, which is not allowed in our model. The last phase should
be performed differently. As both the prover and the verifier have seen
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the second last row, the prover now knows the vector v which is the dual
space of the first n − 1 rows of A. The prover can convince the verifier
that the first n − 1 rows of A are linearly independent and that v indeed
generates the dual space of the first n−1 rows by using a similar idea as in
Subroutine 6.3.2. This verification is done when the last row of A is being
streamed. Namely we can verify the correctness of the one-dimensional
subspace (which is spanned by v) which is the dual to the first n− 1 rows
of A during the process when the last row of A is being streamed. If A
is full rank, an will not belong to the span of the first n − 1 rows of A,
and hence 〈an, v〉 is not equal to zero. On the other hand, if an belongs
to the span of the first n− 1 rows of A, then 〈an, v〉 = 0. The verifier can
check this inner product in a streaming manner when an is being streamed.
The prover needs to provide the vector v for the verifier to compute the
inner product. So, when an is being streamed, the verifier should verify the
correctness of the one-dimensional dual subspace and compute the inner
product 〈an, v〉 as well. This ensures that our protocol has no additional
verification phase after the end of the stream.
Note that once the last row of A2 is seen, the prover knows the dual
space of the first 3n/4 rows, whose column space is W2. The correctness
of W2 is checked in the next phase when A3 is being streamed. This is
the same in the final phase where we check the correctness of the one-
dimensional dual space when an is being streamed. Now when the rows of
A3 are being streamed, the prover needs to compute some zi for each row
of A3 and the correctness of these zi is verified in phase 4. But when an
is being streamed, we do not need to wait for the stream to end to verify
that the inner product of 〈an, z〉 is not zero. This is because the vector z in
this case can be replaced by v, where v generates the dual space of the first
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n− 1 rows of A. This is the main difference in the final phase as compared
to the previous phases.
6.3.3.5 Proof of Completeness and Soundness of Protocol
Firstly, if A1 is full rank, the matrix factorization (6.2) is a witness that
A1 is indeed full rank and if A1 is not full rank, such a factorization does not
exist. Now consider the case where B =
 A1
A2
 is full rank. If the prover
is honest, he can construct {zi}n/4i=1 such that the diagonal entries of L2 is
nonzero. For i < j, since an/2+i ∈ A(n/2+j−1), it follows that L2 is lower
triangular. Moreover, span{ z1 · · · zn/4 } ⊆ W (n/2), which is established in
part (ii) of Subroutine 6.3.2.
Now, we argue that if B is not full rank, P cannot satisfy both (i) and
(ii) of Subroutine 6.3.2 simultaneously. Let an/2+i be such that an/2+i ∈
A(n/2+i−1). By means of contradiction, suppose P can choose a x ∈ Fnp
such that 〈an/2+i, x〉 6= 0. Such a x belongs to W (n/2) and has to satisfy
〈an/2+j, x〉 = 0 for all j = 1, · · · , i − 1. This means x ∈ W (n/2+i−1), which
contradicts 〈an/2+i, x〉 6= 0.
If we know that rank of B is 3n/4, then any n/4 dimensional subspace
V ⊆ Fnp which satisfy the requirements that the inner product with any
row of A2 and any vector in V is zero and that V ⊆ W (n/2) must be the
dual code of B. Thus W2 is the correct representation of the dual code of
B.
On the other hand, if B is not full rank, it is clear that the honest
prover can convince the verifier of this fact.
Inductively, it is clear that in phase 4, by streaming A3 and W2, they
can determine if the rows of {Ai}3i=1 are linearly independent and they can
construct W3, the dual code generated by the rows of {Ai}3i=1. We do not
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need to stream the rows of A1 and A2 in this phase.
In each phase, we are using a constant number of invocations of Freivalds’
technique to verify matrix multiplications. The protocol will err if either
Freivalds’ technique errs or when P streams an incorrect matrix whose
fingerprint is the same as the original matrix. By the union bound, the






6.3.3.6 Analysis of Space and Communication
In each phase, V needs to store a constant number of fingerprints and
O(log n) space to keep track of the rows of the matrix being streamed and to
generate the random bits needed for the matrix multiplication verification.
Hence V needs O(log n) space in this protocol.
As we proceed to the next phase in the protocol, the size of the sub-
matrix of A that we re-stream gets halved, and the dimension of the dual
code also gets halved. Hence, the communication overhead is a constant.
Also, we note that as the last row of A is being streamed, the verifier will
be checking the correctness of the 1-dimensional space, which is the dual
space of the first n − 1 rows of A. As he checks the correctness of this 1-
dimensional subspace, say spanned by v, he should also compute the inner
product of the last row of A with v. This ensures that our protocol is fully
online.
6.3.3.7 Application: Perfect Matching
We show that our FULL RANK protocol can be used to determine
whether a graph has a perfect matching (See Definition 6.3.4) in our model.
The decision problem of deciding whether a given graph G contains a per-
fect matching is known to be in the complexity class RNC but it is still
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open whether it belongs to NC or not. So if one resorts to the GKR proto-
col to determine if a given graph G has a perfect matching, it is not known
how to do it with polylog(m,n) cost and using polylog(m,n) rounds of
interaction.
We show that our FULL RANK protocol can be used to determine if a
graph G = (V,E) with even vertices has a perfect matching in our model,
where the rows of AG, the adjacency matrix of G are being streamed. Let
|V | = n, where n is even. We will make use of Tutte’s Theorem [103] to
devise a protocol for the perfect matching problem.
Theorem 6.3.19. ( Tutte’s Theorem )
Let A be a n× n Tutte matrix of indeterminates obtained from G = (V,E)
as follows: a distinct indeterminate xij is associated with the edge (vi, vj)
where i < j, and the corresponding matrix entries are given by
Aij =

xij if (vi, vj) ∈ E and i < j,
−xji if (vi, vj) ∈ E and i > j,
0 if (vi, vj) 6∈ E.









where Sn is the symmetric group of permutations of size n and sgn(pi) is the
sign of the permutation pi, it follows that det(A) is a polynomial of degree at
most n. Let A˜ be the matrix such that we replace each indeterminate xij for
i < j of A with a random integer rij ∈ {1, · · · , O(n2)} chosen uniformly at
random. Then with probability at least 1−1/n, if G has a perfect matching,
then det(A˜) 6= 0 by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma (See Appendix A.1). On
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the other hand, if G does not have a perfect matching, then det(A˜) = 0 for
any choice of the random rij. As a result, by determining if A˜ has full rank
over R, we can decide with high probability if G has a perfect matching.
We note the following simple observation. Define matrix C ∈ Mn(R)
such that |cij| ≤ m. Suppose C is streamed row-wise. By using the vector
fingerprinting technique (See (3.1)), it is easy to see that the verifier can
check if C has the following structure: cij = −cji for all i 6= j and cii = 0 for
all i = 1, · · · , n. The space needed for the verifier is O(logm+log n−log δ),
where δ is the error of the protocol.
We now describe the perfect matching protocol. When the first row of
AG is streamed, for every non-zero entry a1,i, the verifier chooses a random
integer r1,i uniformly at random from the set {1, · · · , O(n2)} and redefines
a1,i := r1,i. The verifier sends the value of r1,i to the prover after the
symbol a1,i appears on the stream. When the i
th row of AG is streamed,
for all j < i such that ai,j 6= 0, the prover will send rj,i (this was chosen by
the verifier when aj,i was being streamed previously) and the verifier will
redefine ai,j = −rj,i. For all j > i such that ai,j 6= 0, the verifier chooses
a random number ri,j uniformly at random from the set {1, · · · , O(n2)}
and redefines ai,j := ri,j. The verifier sends the value of ri,j to the prover
after the symbol ai,j appears on the stream. From the discussion in the
previous paragraph, the verifier can check if the value of rj,i provided by
the prover is correct whenever j < i. By using our FULL RANK protocol
in Theorem 6.3.18, we have a protocol which decides if G has a perfect
matching.
Theorem 6.3.20. Let G = (V,E) be a graph where |V | = n is even. Let
AG be the adjacency matrix of G which is streamed row-wise. There is
a streaming algorithm with a prover which can decide if G has a perfect
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matching where the verifier uses O(log n) storage and the total communi-






By relaxing the total communication restriction, we managed to find an
algorithm for a problem that is not known to be in NC while maintaining
the full online nature of streaming.
6.4 A Lower Bound on the Number of
Rounds
The streaming algorithms with a prover in [29,30,74] are based on tech-
niques from interactive proofs in complexity theory. All of these streaming
interactive protocols (SIP) are based on the famous sum check protocol
of Lund et al. [84]. A careful inspection of SIP designed from the sum
check protocol reveals that they hold in the Merlin-Arthur streaming model.
They share the feature that after the stream has ended, a short (O(logm)
round for some problems, see Section 4.3) verification phase takes place
between the prover and verifier, i.e., the computation is not fully online
in that sense that the answer can be given right away at the end of the
stream. More importantly, the prover has to work very hard during this
phase, computing certain polynomials depending on the previously hidden
random bits of the verifier. This computation takes at least linear time in
n, and is hence exponentially longer than the communication taking place
during that phase. Is this additional phase really necessary? In Section 6.3,
we have shown that for certain problems, the additional verification phase
can be removed and the prover’s computation overhead can be reduced to
polynomial.
As we have seen in Section 3.4, there is an exponential gap between
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streaming protocols in the Merlin-Arthur and IP models. In this section,
we show that for any problem that is as hard as the Index function in a very
strong sense defined below, any SIP in the Merlin-Arthur streaming model
requires at least Ω(log n/ log log n) rounds of interaction between the prover
and verifier after the end of the stream, otherwise either the communication
complexity during that last phase increases to above polylog(n) or the
space complexity of the verifier increases to above polylog(n). We stress
that this only holds for SIP in the Merlin-Arthur streaming model, where
the messages from the verifier to the prover are random challenges that
neither depend on the stream nor the previous messages from the prover.
Hence the extra verification phase is an inherent feature of Merlin-Arthur
streaming protocols solving such problems, e.g., computing exact frequency
moments Fk (k 6= 1). This is true for both our model and previous models
that bound the total communication but the protocols have to be in the
Merlin-Arthur streaming model. Our proof also shows that for many other
problems (such as computing the rank), at least Ω(log n/ log log n) rounds
are needed for any Merlin-Arthur streaming protocol, or either the total
communication or the verifier’s space will increase to above polylog(n).
We start by defining what it means for a streaming problem to be as
hard as another streaming problem. Let P be a streaming problem, where
we assume that inputs are streams of length n, where each symbol is from
the same universe UP . Similarly, denote by Q another streaming problem
with input length m and universe UQ.
Definition 6.4.1.
1. We say that P strictly reduces to Q if there are functions f1, · · · , fn
that map UP to UQ, m = n, and the output of Q on f1(x1), · · · , fn(xn)
is the same as the output of P on x1, · · · , xn.
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2. We say P weakly reduces to Q if there are functions f1, · · · , fn where
fi : UP → U liQ,
∑n
i=1 li = m, and the output ofQ on f1(x1), · · · , fn(xn)
is the same as the output of P on x1, · · · , xn.
Hence in a weak reduction, one may inflate a single symbol into many.
We give a few examples to illustrate the difference between these two re-
ductions. The function we reduce from is the Index function.
1. There is a strict reduction from Index to (2 − )-approximation of
F∞: map inputs xj to 2j + xj and then maps the index i to 2i + 1.
Clearly if Index(x, i) = 1 then F∞ will be 2 for the image stream,
else it will be 1.
2. There is a weak reduction from Index to Median: map all xj to 2j+xj
and map i to n − 2i times the number 0 if i ≤ n/2. Otherwise, if
i > n/2, map i to 2i−n times the number 2n+ 2. Our algorithm for
Median implies that there can be no strict reduction from Index to
Median.
3. Next we show that the problem of deciding whether if a matrix has
full rank or not has a weak reduction from Index. Consider Index,





. Define X ∈Mn/2(R) whose entries
are as follows: X(r, c) = xn
2
(r−1)+c for 1 ≤ r, c ≤ n/2. Suppose
xi = X(s, t) for some 1 ≤ s, t ≤ n/2. Also define Z˜ ∈ Mn/2(R) such






It is easy to see that if xi = 1, then rank(A) = n − 1. Otherwise,
if xi = 0, then A is full rank. Hence any streaming algorithm that
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decides if A ∈ Mn(R) is full rank or not (where the entries of A are
streamed row-wise) also decides Index on Θ(n2) input bits and we
get a weak reduction from that problem.
We have the following obvious application of our reductions.
Lemma 6.4.2. Let P be a streaming problem where the length of the input
stream is `P and each symbol is from the same universe UP . Similarly,
denote by Q another streaming problem with input length `Q and universe
UQ. Let n := max { `P , `Q, |UP |, |UQ| }.
1. If Problem P can be strictly reduced to problem Q and if every Merlin-
Arthur streaming algorithm for P needs either more than polylog(n)
space, or more than t(n) rounds of communication between the prover
and verifier after the last symbol has been read, or more than polylog(n)
communication after the last symbol has been read, then the same is
true for Q.
2. If P can be weakly reduced to Q and if every Merlin-Arthur streaming
algorithm for P needs either more than polylog(n) space, or more
than t(n) rounds of communication between the prover and verifier,
or more than polylog(n) total communication, then so does Q.
We can simulate the Merlin-Arthur streaming algorithm by an online
Merlin-Arthur communication protocol. The general plan is as follows. A
Merlin-Arthur streaming algorithm for Index can be simulated by a com-
munication protocol in a pretty straightforward way. Here Alice receives x,
Bob receives i, and there are two provers, MerlinA and MerlinB. MerlinA
only sees x, and can only talk to Alice. MerlinB sees x, i and will com-
municate with Bob. Alice and MerlinA simulate the streaming algorithm
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during x, and Bob and MerlinB take over afterwards. The protocol is one-
way, i.e., Alice sends one message to Bob. It becomes clear immediately,
that MerlinA is useless and can be removed, because he does not see any-
thing that Alice doesn’t see. Note that it does not matter how much the
streaming verifier and prover communicate during x. Hence we arrive at a
model where Alice sends one message to Bob and Merlin and Bob exchange
messages. As a result of Theorem 3.3.13, it follows that any SIP which
solves Index in the Merlin-Arthur streaming model needs either more than
polylogarithmic space for the verifier, or at least Ω(log n/ log log n) rounds
between the prover and verifier after the last symbol has appeared on the
stream, or more than polylogarithmic communication after i has appeared
on the stream. Since the first and third possibilities are not allowed in our
model, we can conclude that there has to be a lot of interaction between
prover and verifier in a special verification phase.
For any problem P , given a strict reduction from Index on size n
strings, if we insist on polylog(n) communication overhead and space, this
means that the prover and verifier need a verification phase where they need
to interact over Ω(log n/ log log n) rounds after the end of the stream for
any Merlin-Arthur SIP. We note that the generic protocol in Theorem 4.1.3,
the protocols in [29,30,74] are all in the Merlin-Arthur streaming model.
A weak reduction from Index suffices to show that for the models that
bound the total communication and the verifier’s space, many rounds are
needed if one resorts to using Merlin-Arthur streaming protocols, but those
could potentially take place during the time the stream is observed. Note
that this does not contradict the fact that there exist a protocol which
can determine the exact median of a stream from a universe of [n] using
only three messages and cost O˜(log n) [22]. This is because their 3 message
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protocol for Median is in the IP streaming model. We note that weak
reductions do not imply anything for the model defined in this chapter
though, because we do not restrict the total communication.
We now state the main consequence for streaming algorithms.
Theorem 6.4.3.
1. In the Merlin-Arthur streaming model, any data streaming algorithm
for a problem that has a strict reduction from Index either has to use
more than polylogarithmic communication overhead, or the verifier’s
space is more than polylogarithmic, or there are at least
Ω(log n/ log log n) communication rounds between the prover and ver-
ifier after the end of the stream.
2. In the Merlin-Arthur streaming model, any data streaming algorithm
for a problem that has a weak reduction from Index either has to use
more than polylogarithmic total communication, or the verifier’s space
is more than polylogarithmic, or there are at least Ω(log n/ log log n)
communication rounds between the prover and verifier.
As an example let us consider the problem of approximating F∞. It is
quite easy to see that the problem F∞ can be log n-approximated, with the
total communication and verifier’s space being polylog(n) in a fully online
fashion. To do so, we split the input into log n phases like the phases in
Section 6.3.1, and the prover simply announces the most frequent element
of the previous phase in the next phase, where this claim can be checked
either via re-streaming, or, more communication efficiently, via the sum
check protocol on the arithmetization of the formula performing this check.
Clearly, this gives a (log n)-approximation. This idea can be improved as
follows: instead of reducing the interval size by half in each phase, we
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reduce the interval size exponentially. The same ideas apply, and we get a
(log∗ n)-approximation, although we need to employ the sum check protocol
now.
On the other hand, a (2−)-approximation is not possible in the Merlin-
Arthur streaming model without an extra verification phase due to Theo-
rem 6.4.3, while by the results in [29,30], F∞ can be computed exactly with
O(log2 n) rounds of interaction after the stream has ended. Hence a some-
what good approximation can be computed without the extra verification
phase, but not an arbitrarily good approximation, while exact computation





In this thesis, we have closely examined the data streaming model with
a prover. The main practical motivation is for outsourcing computations
on massive data streams to cloud computing services. But there are many
reasons for the client/verifier to be able to check the correctness of the
answer provided as well. For example, the service provider can have finan-
cial incentives to provide the wrong answer to the the client. Even if the
service provider is honest, errors could occur due to a buggy algorithm or
the algorithm could have encountered a memory error when reading the
massive data which is being streamed at a high speed. We have looked
at designing protocols in both the annotation model and the interactive
streaming model. The verifier, who is severely space restricted, needs to
compute a sketch of the data. This sketch is often the low degree extension
of an appropriate polynomial which depends on the stream. The client then
uses this sketch of the data to reject wrong claims with high probability.
We have seen that for most interesting functions like both the exact
and approximate frequency moments, Index etc., we can get at most a
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quadratic speedup in the annotation model as compared to the standard
model. As in the standard streaming model, the main tool used to show
lower bounds for the prover assisted data streaming model is communica-
tion complexity. Data streaming protocols with a prover can be simulated
by Merlin-Arthur communication protocols, where Merlin is the prover and
the data stream input is split across some players, who together constitute
the verifier Arthur. We stress again that there is a huge difference in com-
plexity between whether the verifier’s message to the prover depends on
the input or just consists of random coin tosses.
For the case where the prover and verifier are allowed to interact for
polylogarithmic many rounds, we can get exponentially cheaper algorithms
than in the annotation model for many problems. Every function in NC
has a streaming interactive protocol whose cost is polylog(m,n) where
polylog(m,n) messages need to be exchanged between the prover and the
verifier. For functions like frequency moments, we require O(log2m) rounds
of interaction which makes these protocols highly impractical. By using the
sum check protocol as a tool, we can devise protocols with polylogarith-
mic cost for F2, F0 and many other problems with O(logm) rounds of
interaction.
Using lower bounds from the theory of Merlin-Arthur communication
complexity, we have investigated the necessity of the additional verification
phase after the stream has ended in the Merlin-Arthur streaming model.
We summarize all the original contributions made in this thesis.
(i) In Corollary 3.3.10, we showed that for k ≥ 3, it is hard to approxi-
mate Fk in the annotation model. Previously it was only known that
for k ≥ 6, it is hard to approximate Fk in the annotation model [21].
For k ≥ 6, our lower bound in Corollary 3.3.10 is only a polynomial
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improvement when compared to the lower bound presented in [21].
(ii) We showed a lower bound for the online Merlin-Arthur communica-
tion complexity model with k messages in Theorem 3.3.13. This lower
bound can be used to study the theoretical properties of the Merlin-
Arthur streaming model. Using our lower bound on the OMAk com-
munication model together with an OIP 2 protocol for the Index
function, Chakrabarti et al. [22] showed a exponential separation be-
tween OMAk and OIP k communication models. This is in contrast
to the non-online version of the Merlin-Arthur communication model
where it is known that the communication complexity classes IP (Al-
ice and Bob have access to private randomness) and AM (Alice and
Bob have access to public randomness) behave similarly to their Tur-
ing machine counterparts [82].
(iii) In Section 4.2, we showed that “IP=PSPACE” holds for online com-
munication complexity. We note that Lokam [82] proved that the
result “IP=PSPACE” holds for the non-online version of communi-
cation complexity. In view of the discussion in (ii), if two non-online
communication complexity classes obey a certain relationship, it is
not always the case that the same relationship will hold for online
communication complexity classes.
(iv) In Chapter 5, we gave a streaming interactive protocol with logm
rounds and polylog(m,n) cost for the exact computation of F0. The
reader is referred to Theorem 5.2.5 for the precise bounds on the help
and verification costs. Prior to our work, the best algorithm known
to compute the exact value of F0 using O(logm) rounds required
the space of the verifier to be O
(




communication was O (
√
n logm (log n+ logm)) [30].
(v) In Chapter 6, we defined a new streaming model that only bounds the
communication overhead, i.e., the amount of communication sent from
the prover to the client per symbol of the data stream. We gave algo-
rithms in our new model for four different streaming problems. They
are Median (Theorem 6.3.5), Longest Increasing Subsequence (Theo-
rem 6.3.13), FULL RANK (Theorem 6.3.18) and the perfect matching
problem (Theorem 6.3.20). By relaxing the total communication re-
quirement, we managed to find an algorithm for the perfect matching
problem for which previously no efficient streaming protocol with a
prover was known. All our algorithms have a similar structure with
phases whose length shrinks geometrically, and phase i is used to ver-
ify certain properties of the stream up to phase i−1 using re-streaming
of parts of the previous stream. The challenge in each case is to tie
the different phases together.
(vi) In previous work [29, 30], it was shown that all problems in the class
NC can be computed in a streaming model with a prover. This general
purpose algorithm tends to be inefficient, and this as well as related
algorithms based on arithmetization techniques suffer from the follow-
ing bottleneck: they employ a final verification phase (taking place
after the end of the stream), which uses polylogarithmic communica-
tion (essentially the only communication in the whole protocol), yet
the prover needs to perform computations that take at least linear
time during that phase. In Section 6.4, we showed that such a verifi-
cation phase with a large number of communication rounds between




We list some open problems related to this thesis.
1. We conjecture that the protocol given in Theorem 3.2.2 for the exact
computation of F0 with complexity O(n
2/3 log4/3 n) in the annota-
tion model is tight, up to polylogarithmic factors. In the online MA
model, it might be easier to prove lower bounds larger than
√
n,
as compared to proving lower bounds in the general Merlin-Arthur
model where such bounds are not known for any explicit function. A
similar problem holds for the computation of the exact value of F∞
in the annotation model.
2. Recall that in the standard streaming model, to obtain a (1 ± )-
approximation of F0, we need O(
−2+logm) space. For an arbitrarily
good approximation, the space complexity is high, as the 1/2 addi-
tive factor can be prohibitively large. One can study the problem of
approximating F0 in the annotation model and see if one can obtain
any tradeoffs in the error parameter .
3. Corollary 3.3.10 shows that approximating Fk in the annotation model
is hard for k ≥ 3. A related problem is to obtain improved tradeoffs on
the help and verification cost for approximating Fk in the annotation
model. An easier problem to consider is to design a (h, v) protocol in
the annotation model which approximates Fk up to constant factors
for k ≥ 3 with h = v = o (√m).
4. An interesting theoretical problem would be to obtain non-trivial
lower bounds on the Arthur-Merlin (AM) communication complexity
of the Disj function or any explicit function. Proving any superlog-
arithmic lower bounds on the AM complexity of Disj will rule out
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constant round streaming interactive protocols for exact Fk (k 6= 1)
with polylogarithmic complexity. The IP streaming model is the most
natural model for delegating computations on data streams. We hope
future work will focus on proving lower bounds in this model, or sim-
ilarly in the O˜IP k communication complexity model (See page 39).
5. We can study the quantum analogue of OIP kcc communication com-
plexity classes which we denote by QOIP kcc. A natural question to ask
is what is the quantum analogue of (3.8)? Aaronson [1] showed that
the power of the complexity class quantum online interactive proofs
with one message is the same as the quantum one-way communi-
cation class. He developed an amplification procedure to boost the
error probability without repeating the proof. To obtain a quantum
one-way protocol, he showed that it is enough to loop over all possible
classical messages from Merlin. It is well know that the quantum one-
way communication complexity of the Index function is Ω(n) [87].
Since Index ∈ OIP 2cc, we have QOIP 1cc ( QOIP 2cc. For QOIP 2cc,
we conjecture that this communication complexity class is the same
as the complexity class Q
(2,B)
cc , where Q(2,B) denotes the quantum
communication complexity where 2 messages are exchanged between
Alice and Bob with Bob sending the first message. One can use the
parallelization of Kitaev and Watrous [69] to show that quantum OIP
communication classes with 3 messages are enough to simulate any
quantum OIP communication class with more than 3 messages.
6. Can we obtain an interactive protocol for the exact computation of
F∞ with logm rounds and polylog(m,n) space and communication?
Since giving a constant approximation of F∞ is hard in the stan-
dard streaming model, the problem of approximating F∞ with logm
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rounds and polylog(m,n) complexity is interesting as well.
7. The fully online algorithm for the new streaming model which bounds
the communication overhead (See Chapter 6) needs to know the
length of the stream in advance. An interesting improvement would
be to modify our protocols to work with unknown stream lengths
while maintaining the structure of our algorithm.
8. For the FULL RANK problem in Subsection 6.3.3, our protocol re-
quires the matrix to be streamed in row major or column major order.
An interesting question is whether our protocol can be modified such
that the matrix entries can appear in any order on the stream? Such
an improvement would lead to an algorithm that decides if an input
graph has a perfect matching, where the edges of the graph can be
presented in any order. Currently for our algorithm, to decide if a
graph has a perfect matching, all the edges of one vertex have to be
presented first before proceeding to the next.
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Let Q(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ F[x1, · · · , xn] be a multivariate polynomial of total
degree d. Fix any finite subset S ⊆ F and let r1, · · · , rn be chosen indepen-
dently and uniformly at random from S. Then
Pr (Q(r1, · · · , rn) = 0 |Q(x1, · · · , xn) 6≡ 0) ≤ d|S| .
A.2 Coding Theory
We give a brief background of coding theory which we will use in this
thesis. For more details of standard definitions, the reader is referred to
[104]. A q-ary linear code C of length n is a linear subspace of Fnq , where q is
some prime power. If C has dimension k, then we call it a [n, k]q code. The
(Hamming) distance between two codewords x, y ∈ C, denoted by d(x, y)
is the number of indices i ∈ [n] such that xi 6= yi. The distance of the code
is defined as the minimum distance over all pairs of distinct codewords in
C. If the minimum distance of the code is d, we denote it by [n, k, d]q. The
generator matrix G ∈ Mn,k(Fq) of the code is a n × k matrix where the
column span of G gives C. The relative distance of the code is d/n and
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the rate of the code is k/n. A linear code is called a good code if both its
relative distance and rate is at most some constant. The Reed-Solomon
code is an example of a good code with alphabet size q = n + 1. But in
our case, we need the alphabet size to be much smaller than n. Justesen
codes [65] are a class of good codes with a constant alphabet size. We
say that a linear code is locally logspace constructible if the (i, j)-entry
of the generator matrix G can be constructed using space O(log n). It is
known that Justesen codes are locally logspace constructible (see Lemma
3.3 of [77]).
A.3 Interactive Proof Systems
The notion of interactive proof systems can be seen as a probabilistic
analogue of the complexity class NP .
Definition A.3.1. ( Turing Machine Interactive Proof (IP) model )
For any integer k ≥ 1 which may depend on the input length, we say a
language L is in IP kTM if there is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing
machine V that interacts with a prover P such that P and V exchange
k messages in total with P sending the last message. Their interaction
should satisfy the following conditions:
• If x ∈ L, then the probability that the verifier accepts is greater than
2/3.
• If x 6∈ L, then even against an optimal prover, the probability that
the verifier accepts is less than 1/3.
Note that all the probabilities are over the random choices of V . The
prover messages do not depend upon the random strings of V , but only on
158
the messages or questions that the verifier sends. We say that the random
strings of V is private.




TM . We say L has an interactive proof
system if L ∈ IPTM.
The Turing machine IP model is sometimes called the private coin inter-
active proof model. We can also consider the public coin interactive proof
model (Arthur-Merlin model) where all the questions of V to the prover
are obtained by tossing coins and revealing them to the verifier.
Definition A.3.2. For every k, the complexity class AMkTM is a subset of
IP kTM obtained when we restrict the messages from V to the prover to be
random bits only. V is not allowed to use any other random bits that are
not contained in these messages. We define AMTM := AM2TM .
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